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ARTICLE 
DUALIST, BUT NOT DIVERGENT: EVALUATING 
UNITED STATES IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1267 
SANCTIONS REGIME 
William Diaz† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In pursuing a unified policy to combat the threat of global terrorism, the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) took sweeping and innovative 
measures by adopting Resolution 1267 (1999) and a number of subsequent 
Resolutions for targeted sanctions against the Taliban,1 Al-Qaeda,2 and their 
associates. Subsequent to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1373 (2001), requiring UN Member States to 
combat terrorism through law enforcement, domestic legal reform, 
multilateral cooperation, ratification of relevant treaties, increased border 
control, and targeted sanctions. These measures are central to the counter-
terror efforts of the United Nations and its Member States. 
While Resolution 1373 imposes a number of requirements upon Member 
States, it reserves considerable discretion in implementation to national 
legal orders. In contrast, the sanctions regime launched by Resolution 1267 
rigidly targets individuals and entities who are part of, or associated with, 
the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, while affording limited due process to targeted 
parties. With Resolution 1267 sanctions still lacking transparency and 
providing limited access to redress, this targeted sanctions regime has 
remained cause for controversy despite continued reform via a number of 
subsequent UNSC Resolutions.3 As a matter of clarification and reference 
for further discussion, both Resolutions 1373 and 1267 provide for 
                                                                                                                           
 † LL.M. 2011, Universiteit Leiden.  The author thanks Dr. Larissa van den Herik of 
Universiteit Leiden for her invaluable supervision.  The author further extends his gratitude 
to friends and former colleagues from Universiteit Leiden and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, for their abundant wisdom and occasional distraction. 
 1. S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999). 
 2. S.C. Res. 1390, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 (Jan. 28, 2002). 
 3. Especially in light of the relatively recent Kadi decision rendered by the European 
Court of Justice. See Case T-306/01, Yusuf and Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council and 
Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-3533; Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. 
II-3649; Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council & 
Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R I-6351 (annulling regulations implementing Resolution 1267). 
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sanctions for terror-related individuals and entities, but they diverge 
considerably in scope and the level of discretion left to states in 
implementation. 
In practice, the United States has been a vocal advocate for targeted 
sanctions, and an active, and perhaps, under-scrutinized proponent for 
listing a range of parties for asset freezing, particularly in the aftermath of 
the attacks on September 11, 2001.4 However, current adherence to 
Resolution 1267 and its amending Resolutions by the United States remains 
a nuanced scenario combining vetting for compatibility with national law, 
the influence exerted by the United States within the sanctions regime, the 
quality and scope of available intelligence, and the functions of an 
established constitutional order. These factors culminate in a national 
implementation that remains dualist yet adherent to obligations under 
Article 25 of the United Nations Charter (UNC Article 25). 
II.  SCOPE 
This article will evaluate United Nations and United States 
implementation and continued compliance under Resolution 1267, while 
discussing Resolution 1373 in a more limited fashion. Part 1 will discuss 
United Nations practice under these Resolutions. Part 2 will evaluate 
United States practice and autonomous review under its dualist 
implementation of Resolution 1267. Part 3 will evaluate the international 
implications of United States implementation. Part 4 will discuss the 
restraints Resolution 1267 has placed on United States unilateralism. 
A.  Security Council Practice in Countering Terrorism 
1.  UN Security Council Practice—Resolution 1373 
In response to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the United 
Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1373 under  
 
                                                                                                                           
 4. THOMAS BIERSTEKER & SUE ECKERT, ADDRESSING CHALLENGES TO TARGETED 
SANCTIONS: AN UPDATE OF THE “WATSON REPORT” 7 (2009); Christopher Cooper, Shunned 
in Sweden: How Drive to Block Funds for Terrorism Entangled Mr. Aden, WALL ST. J., May 
6, 2002, at A1 (“‘In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, there was enormous goodwill and a 
willingness to take on trust any name that the U.S. submitted,’ says a European diplomat 
assigned to the Security Council. He says it was only later that members realized some of 
those named had no firm connection to a violent organization.”). 
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Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.5 Resolution 1373 serves as a 
landmark UNSC Resolution insofar as it represents a clear shift in 
international law. With Resolution 1373, the Security Council uniquely 
wielded its Chapter VII powers to order Member States to specifically act 
or refrain from acting in a context beyond that of disciplining a specific 
state.6 Comprised of fifteen members from the UNSC, the Counter-
Terrorism Committee (CTC) was established to monitor implementation of 
Resolution 1373.7 Specifically, Resolution 1373 imposes a number of 
binding obligations on States, including prohibiting support for terrorists, 
requiring punishment of terrorists and terror supporters, and tightening 
                                                                                                                           
 5. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (“Reaffirming also its 
unequivocal condemnation of the terrorist attacks which took place in New York, 
Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001, and expressing its 
determination to prevent all such acts . . . .”). Since its passage, Resolution 1373 has 
received two amendments, Resolution 1456 adding human rights considerations, and 
Resolution 1566 defining terrorism. S.C. Res. 1456, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456 (Jan. 20, 
2003) (“States must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply with all their 
obligations under international law . . . in particular international human rights, refugee, and 
humanitarian law.”); S.C. Res. 1566, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004). This 
resolution defines terrorism as:  
  Recalls that criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the 
intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the 
purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of 
persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government 
or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which 
constitute offences [sic] within the scope of and as defined in the international 
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances 
justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, 
ethnic, religious or other similar nature, and calls upon all States to prevent 
such acts and, if not prevented, to ensure that such acts are punished by 
penalties consistent with their grave nature . . . . 
Id. ¶ 3. 
 6. See generally Paul C. Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT. 
L. 901 (2002) (discussing the legislative nature of Resolution 1373). 
 7. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 5, ¶ 6. For an overview of the CTC, see generally Eric 
Rosand, Security Council Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight 
Against Terrorism, 97 AM. J. INT. L. 333 (2003). See also Paul C. Szasz, The Security 
Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT. L. 901, 902 n.16 (2002) (“This aspect of 
Resolution 1373 is based on the Council’s practice in connection with the establishment of 
binding economic or other sanctions. In recent years, it has always established a monitoring 
committee to which states are to report their activities in complying with the resolution and 
which may also be charged with taking certain decisions relating to the implementation of 
the sanctions regime.”) The Resolution 1267 Committee serves as an example. 
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border controls. All these actions would typically be reserved for normal 
treaty making processes. 
Resolution 1373 requires States to prevent and suppress terrorist 
financing, while criminalizing willful collection of terror funds.8 The 
Resolution further provides that States should prohibit their nationals “or 
persons or entities in their territories from making funds, financial assets, 
economic resources, financial or other related services available to persons 
who commit or attempt to commit, facilitate or participate in the 
commission of terrorist acts.”9 Resolution 1373 additionally requires States 
to refrain from supporting entities or persons involved in terrorist acts by 
denying safe haven for those who finance, plan, support, or perform 
terrorist acts.10 Finally, States must ensure that terrorists and their 
supporters are brought to justice,11 and must also implement the relevant 
international conventions and protocols to combat terrorism.12  
                                                                                                                           
 8. See generally S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 5. Press Release, Security Council, 
Security Council Unanimously Adopts Wide-Ranging Anti-Terrorism Resolution; Calls for 
Suppressing Financing, Improving International Cooperation, U.N. Doc. SC/7158 (Sept. 28, 
2001), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm. 
 9. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 5, ¶ 1(d); Press Release, Security Council, supra note 8.  
 10. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 5, ¶ 1(c); Press Release, Security Council, supra note 8; 
Emilio J. Cárdenas, The United Nations Security Council’s Quest for Effectiveness, 25 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1341 (2004) (describing Resolution 1373 as “‘[breaking] new ground’ by 
using, for the first time ever, the Council’s Chapter VII powers to direct all Member States 
to take steps to do or refrain from doing what it mandates, in a general context not directly 
related to disciplining any individual country or particular non-state actor”); Reuven Young, 
Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of Terrorism as a Legal Concept in International Law 
and Its Influence on Definitions in Domestic Legislation, 29 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 23, 
42 (2006) (describing Resolution 1373 as “the first use of Chapter VII powers to order states 
to take or refrain from specific actions other than when disciplining a specific country.”). 
 11. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 5, ¶ 2(e); Press Release, Security Council, supra note 8. 
 12. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 5, ¶ 3(d). The anti-terror treaty regime includes thirteen 
international conventions, as well as several regional conventions (in chronological order): 
Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sep. 14, 
1963, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 
Dec. 16, 1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against 
the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sep. 23, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 178; Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic 
Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; International Convention against the Taking of 
Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material, Mar. 3, 1980, 1456 U.N.T.S. 246; Protocol on the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary 
to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 
Feb. 24, 1988, 1652 U.N.T.S. 499; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against 
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Despite the broad and comprehensive nature of Resolution 1373, it 
leaves implementation to the discretion of individual States via domestic 
and/or regional legal orders.13 Specifically, States are left to decide under 
Resolution 1373 implementation who is to be targeted for sanctions, what is 
to be considered terrorism, and what amounts to a terrorist attack.14 As 
such, the scope of Resolution 1373 extends beyond merely Al-Qaeda, the 
Taliban, and associated parties. Overall, Resolution 1373’s reliance on 
national or regional discretion in implementation is distinct from the more 
rigid requirements of Resolution 1267. 
                                                                                                                           
the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221; Protocol for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the 
Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304; Convention on the Marking of Plastic 
Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Mar. 1, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 721; International 
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256; 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 
39 I.L.M. 270. Regional instruments include: International Convention for the Suppression 
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Apr. 13, 2005, UN Doc. A/RES/59/290. Regional conventions 
include (in chronological order): OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism 
Taking the Form of Crimes against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International 
Significance, Feb. 2, 1971; European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 
1977; SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, Nov. 4, 1987; Arab 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Apr. 22, 1998; Treaty on Cooperation among 
States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism, Jun. 
4, 1999; Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating 
International Terrorism, Jul. 1, 1999; OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of 
Terrorism, Jul. 14, 1999, 
 13. The Court of First Instance of the European Union addressed the discretion reserved 
within Resolution 1373, in T-228/02, Org. eds Modjahedines du people d’Iran v. Council of 
the European Union, 2006 E.C.R. II-4665 (annulling Council Regulation (EC) No. 
2580/2001, implemented under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001)). Resolution 
1373 vests individual states with the discretion to manage lists and apply domestic procedure 
in applying sanctions. 
 14. States implementing measures under Resolution 1373 may define terrorism as they 
see fit, resulting in a potentially broader scope than that of Resolution 1267. See, e.g., Exec. 
Order No. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49079 (Sept. 25, 2001), § 3(d). Note that while Executive 
Order 13224 represents the domestic implementation of Resolution 1267, it applies in a 
broader manner beyond Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, favoring a statutory definition of 
terrorism that falls within Resolution 1373 implementation. Executive Order 13224 defines 
terrorism as  
an activity that—(i) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, 
property, or infrastructure; and (ii) appears to be intended—(A) to intimidate or 
coerce a civilian population; (B) to influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion; or (C) to affect the conduct of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination, kidnapping, or hostage-taking. 
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2.  UN Security Council Practice—Resolution 1267 
Adopted in 1999, Resolution 1267 targeted the Taliban and, in part, 
served as a response to the 1998 bombings of United States embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania, bombings attributed to Usama bin Laden.15 Unlike 
Resolution 1373, Resolution 1267 creates a sanctions regime and 
committee concerned solely with listing a limited class of individuals and 
entities for targeted sanctions, including asset freezing. While the 
Resolution 1267 Regime16 initially targeted Taliban-related parties and 
assets for freezing, Resolution 1390 incorporated the Al-Qaeda terror 
network for targeted sanctions.17 
A critical tool in United Nations anti-terror measures, the Resolution 
1267 Regime requires Member States to freeze assets, exclude listed 
entities from their territories, and prevent the supply of arms and military 
equipment to listed parties associated with Al-Qaeda or the Taliban.18 
                                                                                                                           
 15. Resolution 1267 targeted the Taliban; Resolution 1390 added Al-Qaeda to the 
Resolution 1267 Regime. See S.C. Res. 1390, supra note 2 (imposing sanctions on Usama 
bin Laden, Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated parties); S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 1, at 2 
(“Noting the indictment of Usama bin Laden and his associates by the United States of 
America for, inter alia, the 7 August 1998 bombings of the United States embassies in 
Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and for conspiring to kill American nationals 
outside the United States, and noting also the request of the United States of America to the 
Taliban to surrender them for trial . . . .”); James C. McKinley Jr., Two U.S. Embassies in 
East Africa Bombed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1998 (reporting the attacks on United States 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania). 
 16. This term will be employed to describe the totality of practice under Resolution 
1267 and its subsequent amending Resolutions. 
 17. S.C. Res. 1390, supra note 2, at 1 (recalling Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 
1363 (2001), and reaffirmng Resolutions 1368 (2001), 1373 (2001), 1378 (2001), and 1383 
(2001)). Resolution 1390 is novel in that it targets non-state entities absent a territorial 
connection. 
 18. S.C. Res. 1904 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1904 (Dec. 17, 2009), at 2 (“Emphasizing that 
sanctions are an important tool under the Charter of the United Nations in the maintenance 
and restoration of international peace and security, and stressing in this regard the need for 
robust implementation of the measures in paragraph 1 of this resolution as a significant tool 
in combating terrorist activity . . . .”). See The Consolidated List Established and Maintained 
by the 1267 Committee with Respect to al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, and the Taliban and 
Other Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Entities Associated with Them (Mar. 24, 
2011), available at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/consolidatedlist.pdf.  
The Consolidated List consists of the four sections: 
A. Individuals associated with the Taliban  
B. Entities and other groups and undertakings associated with the Taliban  
C. Individuals associated with Al-Qaida  
D. Entities and other groups and undertakings associated with Al-Qaida 
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Listing and delisting of individuals and entities is at the discretion of the 
1267 Committee, a subcommittee of the Security Council. Controversially, 
and despite various amending resolutions, the 1267 Regime continues to 
lack pre-designation notice, a right to hearing, and independent judicial 
review.19 As a result, States have successfully listed individuals and entities 
while sharing minimal evidence with other members of the 1267 
Committee. Limited process and notice has given rise to a perception of 
unfairness and engendered opposition, including hesitancy on the part of 
some Member States to name individuals and entities for targeted 
sanctions.20  
a. Listing—Security Council Practice 
The 1267 Regime is saddled with a broadly based perception that it lacks 
procedural fairness and an effective post-designation remedy.21 Listing 
begins with submissions by Member States for consideration by the 1267 
Committee.22 Submissions should, “to the extent possible,” include the 
basis for designation.23 States are “strongly encouraged,” but not required, 
to seek additional information on an individual from the target’s state(s) of 
                                                                                                                           
 19. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1333, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000); S.C. Res. 1363, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1363 (July 30, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 5; S.C. Res. 1390, supra 
note 2; S.C. Res. 1452, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1452 (Dec. 20, 2002); S.C. Res. 1455, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1455 (Jan. 17, 2003); S.C. Res. 1624, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1624 (Sept. 14, 2005); S.C. 
Res. 1699, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1699 (Aug. 8, 2006); S.C. Res. 1730, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1730 
(Dec. 19, 2006); S.C. Res. 1735, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1735 (Dec. 22, 2006); S.C. Res. 1822, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1822 (June 30, 2008); S.C. Res. 1904, supra note 18. 
 20. Case T-306/01, Yusuf and Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council and Comm’n, 2005 
E.C.R. II-3533; Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649; Joined 
Cases C-402 & 415/05P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council & Comm’n, 2008 
E.C.R I-6351; Sayadi v. Belgium, Views, Human Rights Comm., 94th Sess., No. 1472/2006, 
P 10.13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006 (2008); Abdelrazik v. Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, [2009] F.C. 580 (Can.); BIERSTEKER & ECKERT, supra note 4, at 8 (“[M]ore than 50 
Member States have expressed concern about the lack of due process and absence of 
transparency associated with listing and delisting.”); WATSON INSTITUTE TARGETED 
SANCTIONS PROJECT, STRENGTHENING TARGETED SANCTIONS THROUGH FAIR AND CLEAR 
PROCEDURES 6 (2006), available at http://watsoninstitute.org/pub/Strengthening_ 
Targeted_Sanctions.pdf (citing the Third and Fourth Reports of the 1267 Monitoring Team, 
available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267mg.htm). 
 21. WATSON INSTITUTE, supra note 20.  
 22. U.N. Sec. Council, Comm. Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 Concerning Al-
Qaida & the Taliban & Associated Individuals & Entities, Guidelines of the Committee for 
the Conduct of Its Work, ¶ 6(a) (Jan. 26, 2011) [hereinafter Committee Guidelines], available 
at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/1267_guidelines.pdf. 
 23. Committee Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 6(c).  
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residence and/or nationality.24 Criminal charges or convictions are not a 
prerequisite for listing, given its intended preventive nature.25 Member 
States must use specific forms and information must be provided for 
proposing names for inclusion.26 In addition, Member States may co-
sponsor new designations when listing requests are under consideration.27  
Because evidence serving as the basis for a listing may be sensitive in 
nature, States may be hesitant to share relevant intelligence, even with other 
1267 Committee members.28 
The overall criteria, providing listing for those “obstructing the peace 
process” and the ability to list based on “association”29 with Al-Qaeda or 
the Taliban remain controversial, especially since evidence justifying listing 
may be scant.30 In practice, statements of case presented to the 1267 
Committee have varied widely in length and quality.31 In 2006, it was 
reported that there was typically little consultation with affected Member 
States, as only states currently on the Security Council were receiving and 
reviewing evidence for listing.32 This lack of transparency was further 
compounded by the lack of shared intelligence between 1267 Committee 
members. Ongoing reforms to the 1267 Regime—though episodic and 
                                                                                                                           
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. ¶ 6(c) (“A criminal charge or conviction is not a prerequisite for listing as the 
sanctions are intended to be preventive in nature.”). 
 26. Id. ¶ 6(d) (“When proposing names for inclusion on the Consolidated List, Member 
States should use the standard forms for listing available on the Committee’s website and 
shall include as much relevant and specific information as possible on a proposed name 
. . . .”). 
 27. Id. ¶ 6(g).  
 28. Despite being a relatively early criticism of the Resolution 1267 Regime, this 
problem persists. See Peter Gutherie, Security Council Sanctions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 491, 528 (2004). 
 29. S.C. Res. 1617, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005), ¶ 4. Resolution 1617 has 
operated to limit the scope of “association.” 
 30. WATSON INSTITUTE, supra note 20. 
 31. Id. at 26. (“At one end of the continuum, a joint submission from two Member States 
recommending the listing of three individuals allegedly included a general background on 
the organization with which they were affiliated, followed by six detailed paragraphs on 
each individual, with specific information relating to actions they have allegedly taken. 
Another statement of case proposing the listing of six individuals included 70 pages of faxed 
material, including copies of arrest warrants. At the other end of the spectrum was a 
statement of case that purportedly included 74 names, with only a single, general paragraph 
of justification. Due to the general nature of the statement of case, a hold was placed on the 
latter request and the committee did not list the names.”). 
 32. Id. at 1.  
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reactive—at least suggest a trend toward greater transparency, availability 
of information, and ease of communication.33 
The first reform in February 2001 approved humanitarian aid exemptions 
by the Resolution 1267 Committee. Security Council Resolution 1452 
(2002) introduced exemption provisions, as well as timely post-designation 
notification to listed individuals or entities.34 Resolution 1455 (2003) 
emphasized the importance of identifying information while also revising 
listing guidelines and list-updating procedures.35 Resolution 1526 (2004) 
continued the trend toward greater protection of targeted parties, requiring 
more robust identifying and background information, and calling for the 
appointment of a sanctions monitor team.36 Resolution 1617 (2005) 
emphasized the need for case details by providing clarification of what 
should be contained in statements of case.37 Quite significantly, Resolution 
1730 (2006) created a focal point, broadening the ability to challenge listing 
by permitting parties to petition in the absence of state sponsorship.38 
Resolution 1735 (2006), incorporating recommendations from the 2006 
Watson Report, further elaborated upon the content that should be included 
in statements of case and the procedures to improve upon deficiencies in 
notification.39 Resolution 1822 (2008) continued to improve notification 
processes, while continuing to re-assess the 1267 Regime and make 
recommendations for greater transparency.40 Included in Resolution 1822 is 
a mandatory requirement for statements of case and narrative summaries for 
all listees.41 Resolution 1822 included significant procedural reforms for the 
Resolution 1267 Regime: a review of all listees within two years, an 
ongoing review process thereafter, and narrative summaries published on 
the Internet.42 Resolution 1904 (2009) provides for the appointment of an 
ombudsman, as discussed at length in section 1.2.3.43 
                                                                                                                           
 33. BIERSTEKER & ECKERT, supra note 4, at 12.  
 34. S.C. Res. 1452, supra note 19; see also BIERSTEKER & ECKERT, supra note 4, at 56. 
 35. S.C. Res. 1455, supra note 19; see also BIERSTEKER & ECKERT, supra note 4, at 56.  
 36. S.C. Res. 1526, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1526 (2004); see also BIERSTEKER & ECKERT, 
supra note 4, at 57. 
 37. S.C. Res. 1617, supra note 29; see also BIERSTEKER & ECKERT, supra note 4, at 57.  
 38. S.C. Res. 1730, supra note 19; see also BIERSTEKER & ECKERT, supra note 4, at 57.  
 39. S.C. Res. 1735, supra note 19; see also BIERSTEKER & ECKERT, supra note 4, at 57.  
 40. S.C. Res. 1822, supra note 19; see also BIERSTEKER & ECKERT, supra note 4, at 57.  
 41. S.C. Res. 1822, supra note 19; see also BIERSTEKER & ECKERT, supra note 4, at 57.  
 42. S.C. Res. 1822, supra note 19; see also BIERSTEKER & ECKERT, supra note 4, at 57.  
 43. S.C. Res. 1904, supra note 18; see also BIERSTEKER & ECKERT, supra note 4, at 57.  
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Under current procedures, the 1267 Committee considers listing requests 
within a period of ten full working days, a time frame that may be 
expedited in cases of emergency and necessity.44 Listing decisions are 
generally taken by consensus.45 Committee Members and the Monitoring 
Team are called upon, but not obligated, to share information with the 1267 
Committee.46 Information to be shared in a non-compulsory manner 
includes any information available regarding a listing request, to inform 
listing decisions and provide a narrative summary for listing.47 
Upon addition to the Consolidated List, the Committee, in cooperation 
with other parties, publicizes a narrative summary of reasons for the listing 
on its website48 and publishes relevant releasable information.49 In its 
notification, the Secretariat invites States to provide, in accordance with 
national law, details on measures taken to freeze assets of the individuals or 
entities listed.50 
Despite consultative processes amongst Committee members, the 
Monitoring Team, and Member States, the listing process is perceived as 
extralegal and opaque. While the necessity to omit pre-designation notice is 
widely accepted,51 the lack of subsequent hearings, judicial processes, or 
compulsory disclosure of evidence, all contribute to this unfavorable 
perception.52 
                                                                                                                           
 44. Committee Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 6(h).  
 45. WATSON INSTITUTE, supra note 20, at 29-30.  
 46. Committee Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 6(i).  
 47. Id.  
 48. S.C. Res. 1822, supra note 19, ¶ 13 (“Directs the [1267] Committee, with the 
assistance of the Monitoring Team and in coordination with the relevant designating States, 
after a name is added to the Consolidated List, to make accessible on the Committee’s 
website a narrative summary of reasons for listing for the corresponding entry or entries on 
the Consolidated List, and further directs the Committee, with the assistance of the 
Monitoring Team and in coordination with the relevant designating States, to make 
accessible on the Committee’s website narrative summaries of reasons for listing for entries 
that were added to the Consolidated List before the date of adoption of this resolution . . . .”). 
 49. Committee Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 6(k).  
 50. Id. ¶ 6(n). 
 51. Kadi v. Council and Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649; Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05P, 
Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council & Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R I-6351, ¶¶ 134–135 
(stating the requiring pre-designation notice would render sanctions useless.); Global Relief 
Foundation, Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963), and describing pre-designation notice as a “suicide 
pact”). 
 52. See generally Jared Genser & Kate Barth, When Due Process Concerns Become 
Dangerous: The Security Council’s 1267 Regimes and the Need for Reform, 33 B.C. INT’L & 
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b. Delisting—Security Council Practice 
Despite the many amending Security Council Resolutions, the 1267 
Regime remains subject to frequent criticism due to its amorphous 
threshold for listing, and the limited due process afforded to listed parties 
seeking removal from the Consolidated List.53 
Section 7 of the 1267 Committee’s guidelines provides the procedure for 
requesting delisting.54 Currently, the Office of the Ombudsperson receives 
these requests, by or on behalf of the petitioner.55 States may submit 
requests for delisting after “having bilaterally consulted with the 
designating State(s), the State(s) of nationality, residence or incorporation, 
where applicable.”56 
Upon request of a Member State to the 1267 Committee, the delisting 
request shall be placed on the Committee’s agenda for more detailed 
consideration. The Committee then gives consideration to the opinions of 
designating State(s), State(s) of residence, nationality or incorporation. 
Members of the 1267 Committee are “called upon,” but not required “to 
make every effort to provide reasons for objecting to delisting requests.”57 
The Secretariat shall inform the Members of the Committee whether an 
objection has been received and the Consolidated List will be updated when 
appropriate.58  
Should a delisting request of a Member State be rejected, the 1267 
Committee’s decision is provided to “the State submitting the request, the 
State(s) where the individual or entity is believed to be located and, in the 
case of individuals, the country of which the person is a national (to the 
                                                                                                                           
COMP. L. REV. 1 (2010) (extensively discussing the tension between confidentiality of 
sensitive intelligence and the functions of due process.); WATSON INSTITUTE, supra note 20 
(discussing the lack of transparency and deficiency of process in the Resolution 1267 
Regime.); BIERSTEKER & ECKERT, supra note 4, at 36-37 (discussing the challenges posed by 
intelligence-sharing in the context of the European Court of Justice and the Kadi case). 
 53. BIERSTEKER & ECKERT, supra note 4, at 8 (“[M]ore than 50 Member States have 
expressed concern about the lack of due process and absence of transparency associated with 
listing and delisting.”). 
 54. Sec. Council Comm. Fact Sheet on delisting, available at 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/fact_sheet_delisting.shtml (last visited July 2, 2011). 
 55. Committee Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 7(c).  
 56. Request For delisting from the Consolidated List Maintained by the Security 
Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning Al-Qaida 
and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities, available at 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/De-listing%20form%20-%20English.pdf 
 57. Committee Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 7(h). 
 58. Id. ¶ 7(g). 
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extent this information is known).”59 This notification includes the 1267 
Committee’s decision, an updated summary of reasons for listing, and 
available “publicly releasable information” about the decision.60  
While Resolution 1730 provides that the United Nations Secretariat 
receive challenges from listed individuals, individual petitioners still lack 
any right to actively participate in a hearing or any live testimony during 
review, and outcomes are still not governed by legal principles or 
procedure.61 While the United Nations has established an Ombudsperson as 
an intermediary for Resolution 1267 matters, the Ombudsperson lacks 
substantive decision-making power or even access to substantive evidence 
kept as state secrets. As such, the Ombudsperson ultimately fails to offer 
significantly enhanced due process within the sanctions regime. 
c. Resolution 1904—Establishing the Ombudsperson 
Drafted by the United States, and unanimously adopted by the Security 
Council, Resolution 1904 serves to increase due process guarantees within 
the Resolution 1267 Regime.62 Established pursuant to paragraph 20 of 
Security Council Resolution 1904, the Office of the Ombudsperson 
assumes various tasks in the delisting process. Appointed by the Secretary 
General,63 the Ombudsperson serves as an information gathering agent and 
intermediary between a petitioner and the 1267 Committee. This 
Ombudsperson lacks any substantive review powers as discretion for 
delisting remains solely within the auspices of the 1267 Committee. 
                                                                                                                           
 59. Id. ¶ 6(n). 
 60. Id. ¶ 6(k). 
 61. S.C. Res. 1730, supra note 19. 
 62. Amnesty Int’l, Security Council’s Creation of Ombudsperson To Look at Al Qaida 
and Taliban Sanctions Regime Welcome but Insufficient, Al Index IOR 41/032/2009 (Dec. 
17, 2009). “The resolution [Resolution 1904] unanimously adopted today, drafted by the 
USA, builds upon the persistent work of a small group of dedicated countries outside and 
inside the Security Council, as well as NGOs, insisting that due process guarantees must be 
incorporated in the Security Council’s listing and delisting procedures.” 
 63. S.C. Res. 1904, supra note 18 (authorizing the appointment of Ombudsperson to 
handle delisting issues). Press Release, Security Council, Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions 
Committee Welcomes Appointment of Judge Kimberly Prost to Serve as Ombudsperson 
SC/9947 (2010) This position is currently held by Kimberly Prost, appointed by the 
Secretary General on June 3, 2010; Press Release, Security Council, Dep’t of Pub. Info, 
Security Council Amends United Nations Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Regime, Authorizes 
Appointment of Ombudsperson to Handle Delisting Issues, U.N. Doc, SC/9825 (Dec. 17, 
2009) (asserting that “[Resolution 1267] was a significant step forward in the fairness and 
transparency of the sanctions regime, thus improving its effectiveness and legitimacy”). 
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The Ombudsperson operates in an intermediary administrative capacity. 
The Ombudsperson informs the petitioner of delisting procedure, fields 
questions, and informs the petitioner as to whether a delisting request 
properly addresses the original designation criteria.64 Petitions are then 
forwarded by the Ombudsperson to the 1267 Committee, designating 
State(s), States(s) of residency/nationality, relevant United Nations bodies, 
and States deemed relevant by the Ombudsperson.65 The Ombudsperson 
engages in dialogue with the above mentioned parties in order to determine 
opinions as to whether the delisting request should be granted, while also 
gathering “information, questions or requests for clarifications that these 
States would like to be communicated to the petitioner regarding the 
delisting request . . . .”66 
The Ombudsperson also forwards delisting requests to the Monitoring 
Team who then provide all relevant information available to the Monitoring 
Team, including decisions and proceedings, news reports, and information 
that States or relevant international organizations have previously shared 
within the 1267 Regime.67 After an information-gathering period, the 
Ombudsperson facilitates a period of engagement, including dialogue with 
the petitioner.68 During this period, the Ombudsperson may ask the 
petitioner to provide additional information and clarifications for the 1267 
Committee’s consideration.69 
Based on an analysis of all available information, the Ombudsperson 
provides the 1267 Committee with the principal arguments concerning 
delisting.70 The 1267 Committee reviews this Comprehensive Report, 
ultimately deciding the delisting request, and informing the Ombudsperson 
                                                                                                                           
 64. Committee Guidelines, supra note 22, Annex, ¶ 10 (“After the Committee 
consideration, the Committee shall decide whether to approve the delisting request through 
its normal decision-making procedures”). 
 65. S.C. Res. 1904 supra note 18, Annex, II, ¶ 2 (“For delisting petitions not returned to 
the petitioner, the Ombudsperson shall immediately forward the delisting request to the 
members of the Committee, designating State(s), State(s) of residence and nationality or 
incorporation, relevant United Nations bodies, and any other States deemed relevant by the 
Ombudsperson. The Ombudsperson shall ask these States or relevant United Nations bodies 
to provide, within two months, any appropriate additional information relevant to the 
delisting request.”). 
 66. Id. ¶ 2(b).  
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. ¶ 3(a). 
 69. Id. ¶ 6(a). 
 70. Id. ¶ 7(c). 
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of the decision, who, in turn, notifies the petitioner.71 This dynamic 
suggests the Ombudsperson may influence the decision making process 
based on its submissions, but substantive decision-making remains wholly 
reserved by the 1267 Committee. In addition, the Ombudsperson, in its 
information gathering remains beholden to the whims of states who may be 
unwilling to disclose sensitive intelligence that may have been relied upon 
in advocating the initial listing. 
While facilitating communication and easing the transfer of information 
may increase transparency and perceptions of legitimacy, the 
Ombudsperson essentially operates as an empty vessel, providing a 
procedural and communicative interface, while wholly lacking substantive 
adjudicative powers. In addition, the Ombudsperson’s contributions to 
transparency are essentially hamstrung, as all communications with the 
petitioner “shall respect the confidentiality of Committee deliberations and 
confidential communications between the Ombudsperson and Member 
States.”72 Thus, the sensitive nature of communications and the need for 
confidentiality maintain primacy over transparency, regardless of the 
Ombudsperson’s mandate. 
                                                                                                                           
 71. Id. ¶¶ 11–13. 
  11. If the Committee decides to grant the delisting request, then the 
Committee shall inform the Ombudsperson of this decision. The 
Ombudsperson shall then inform the petitioner of this decision and the listing 
shall be removed from the Consolidated List. 
  12. If the Committee decides to reject the delisting request, then the 
Committee shall convey to the Ombudsperson its decision including, as 
appropriate, explanatory comments, any further relevant information about the 
Committee’s decision, and an updated narrative summary of reasons for listing. 
  13. After the Committee has informed the Ombudsperson that the 
Committee has rejected a delisting request, then the Ombudsperson shall send 
to the petitioner, with an advance copy sent to the Committee, within fifteen 
days a letter that: 
  (a) Communicates the Committee’s decision for continued listing; 
  (b)Describes, to the extent possible and drawing upon the Ombudsperson’s 
Comprehensive Report, the process and publicly releasable factual information 
gathered by the Ombudsperson; and, 
  (c) Forwards from the Committee all information about the decision 
provided to the Ombudsperson pursuant to paragraph 12 above. 
 72. Committee Guidelines, supra note 22, Annex, ¶ 14 (“In all communications with the 
petitioner, the Ombudsperson shall respect the confidentiality of Committee deliberations 
and confidential communications between the Ombudsperson and Member States.”). 
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3. A Brief Comparison of Resolution 1373 and Resolution 1267 
 Implementation and Review 
While Resolutions 1373 and 1267 concern similar content, they fulfill 
distinct roles, and demand different approaches to implementation.73 In 
offering a discussion of domestic implementation of Resolution 1267, 
certain distinctions should be noted in comparison to Resolution 1373. 
Resolution 1267 is overseen by the 1267 Committee, a subsidiary organ 
of the Security Council.74 In contrast, practice under Resolution 1373 is 
overseen by the Counter-Terrorism Committee, a Security Council 
Committee guided by, and overseeing implementation of Security Council 
Resolutions 1373 and 1624.75 The 1267 Committee was initially established 
on October 15, 1999 as part of the imposition of sanctions on the Taliban 
and Al-Qaeda.76 The 1267 Committee is solely a sanctions committee.77 In 
contrast, the CTC is neither a sanctions committee, nor does it keep a list, it 
simply monitors the implementation of Resolution 1373.78 While the 1267 
Committee and the CTC both operate to implement counter terrorism 
measures, their roles are distinct yet complementary.79 The 1267 Committee 
and the CTC are complementary insofar as each committee oversees the 
implementation of specific counter terrorism measures created by the 
Security Council, but do so from different perspectives.80 
With regard to mandate, the CTC monitors the implementation of 
Resolution 1373, while further working to facilitate assistance to states 
having difficulties in implementing.81 In contrast, the 1267 Committee 
                                                                                                                           
 73. See generally Press Release, Security Council, Distinctions Between Security 
Council Committees Dealing With Terrorism, U.N. Doc, SC/7827 (July 28, 2003). 
 74. S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 1, ¶ 1(b). The 1267 Committee is comprised of all 
Security Council members. 
 75. Press Release, Security Council, Distinctions Between Security Council Committees 
Dealing With Terrorism, U.N. Doc, SC/7827 (July 28, 2003); Paul C. Szasz, The Security 
Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J. INT. L. 901, 902 (2002); Comparative Table Regarding 
The United Nations Security Council Committees Established Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 
(1999), 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004), available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/. 
 76. Id.  
 77. S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 74; Press Release, supra note 75, ¶ 1(a).  
 78. Supra note 75.  
 79. Id. Although the 1267 Committee and the CTC share the same objective of fighting 
terrorism, the activities of the two committees are different but complementary in combating 
terrorism. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Debra M. Strauss, Reaching Out to the International Community: Civil Lawsuits as 
the Common Ground in the Battle Against Terrorism, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 307, 
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oversees implementation-targeted sanctions for those included on the 1267 
Committee’s Consolidated List. The 1267 Committee and CTC both report 
to the Security Council independent of each other. In discussing United 
States practice under Resolution 1267, consideration of Resolution 1373 is 
essential insofar as domestic implementation of Resolution 1267 has 
effectively been subsumed within the broader implementation of Resolution 
1373. 
III. UNITED STATES PRACTICE— IMPLEMENTING RESOLUTION 1267 
A. United States Implementation and Domestic Merger of Resolution 1267 
with Resolution 1373 
While UNSC Resolution 1267 and UNSC Resolution 1373 are separate 
in content and in their administration at the international level, United 
States practice reflects a merger of the content of Resolution 1267 into the 
broader implementation of Resolution 1373, while still remaining 
compliant with UNC Article 25.82 From its initial passage, United States 
implementation of Resolution 1373 has combined law enforcement 
efforts,83 multilateral cooperation,84 and frameworks for three listing 
regimes. Included amongst these listing regimes is asset freezing through 
implementation of Resolution 1267 via Executive Order 13224.85 Executive 
                                                                                                                           
343-44 (2009) (describing the CTC as “particularly vital to the success of this resolution, as 
it was to be the major-capacity building mechanism that would give the states the capability 
to implement and enforce the resolution’s mandates”). 
 82. Letter Dated Feb. 19, 2004 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee 
Established Pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001). As early as 2001, the United States has 
included Executive Order 13224 as part of compliance with Resolution 1373. Note that 
Executive Order 13224 listing encompasses Resolution 1267 listing while also adding 
domestic entries unrelated to Al-Qaeda or the Taliban. http://www.unclef.com/ 
en/sc/ctc/docs/founding/s-2004-124.pdf 
 83. Id. (discussing law enforcement based implementation of Resolution 1373, 
including: (1) creation of a Foreign Terrorist Task Force; (2) creation of the Interagency 
Financial Investigation Group; and (3) prosecution of Al-Qaeda suspects; enhanced visa/ 
passport protection; (4) Regional cooperation on border security). 
 84. Id. (indicating support for: (1) UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing 
of Terrorism; (2) UN Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; and (3) 
coordination of multilateral cooperation in line with UNSCR operational information.). 
 85. Exec. Order No. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (2001) (listing “foreign terrorist 
groups” (FTO) and criminalizing material support under the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act (18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(6)); Terror Exclusion List (restricting entry into 
the United States, under Section 411 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
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Order 13224 implements Resolution 1267 while also extending domestic 
listing and asset freezing beyond those included in the Security Council’s 
Consolidated List. 
The three listing regimes instituted within the United States warrant brief 
differentiation. Executive Order 13224 is an act of the Executive, 
implementing Resolution 1267.86 Specifically, it concerns the freezing of 
assets, including blocking property and prohibiting transactions with 
persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism, so-called 
Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT).87 This is the only United 
States listing regime that will be dealt with in detail below. Additional 
domestic lists do not involve implementation of Resolution 1267, thus they 
warrant less attention within this article. The first of these additional lists 
operates under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(AEDPA), criminalizing material support to designated foreign terror 
organizations.88 In addition, the Terror Exclusion List, part of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, is yet another listing regime.89 Those 
listed under the Terror Exclusion List are prohibited from entering the 
United States.90 Listing under the AEDPA or the Immigration and 
Nationality Act should not be confused with Executive Order 13224, the 
key provision in implementing Resolution 1267 domestically. 
In assessing the function of Executive Order 13224 as one, in a group of 
internal-domestic listing regimes, the United States implementation of 
Resolution 1267 lacks the complementary relationship to Resolution 1373 
demonstrated at the United Nations level. In contrast, domestic 
implementation within the United States suggests an incorporation of 
Resolution 1267, via Executive Order 13224 into a system retaining 
domestic discretion for judicial review reserved for implementation of 
                                                                                                                           
56, § 411, 115 Stat. 272, 346 (2001), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/ 
123086.htm (last visited July, 2011)). 
 86. Exec. Order No. 13224; S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999). 
 87. Exec. Order No. 13224. The Executive Order invokes Resolution 1267, but does not 
mention S.C. Res. 1373, P 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (SDGT designation is 
not specific to Al-Qaeda or Taliban). 
 88. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 subtitle B sec. 321 (codified in part at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2331–2339D (2006)); U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Jan. 
19, 2010, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (providing FTO List and an 
overview of the designation process. Portions of this legislation addressing the death penalty 
lack substantive bearing on the issue of terror financing). 
 89. Terror Exclusion List, restricting entry into the United States, under Section 411 of 
the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
 90. Id. 
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Resolution 1373. Simply stated, the United States exercises review over 
Resolution 1267 implementation in the same fashion it does over measures 
within the scope of Resolution 1373.91 
B.  United States Subordination of Resolution 1267 to a Domestic 
Constitutional Order 
The United States remains constitutionally entrenched in an objectively 
dualist approach toward the implementation of treaty and other 
international obligations, including the listing/sanctions regime created 
under Resolution 1267. While subjecting Resolution 1267 implementation 
to domestic judicial review risks a violation of UNC Article 25, this has not 
yet occurred.92 
To understand the United States’ practice in implementing Resolution 
1267, the nation’s constitutional order warrants an overview. Within the 
United States, there exists no higher law than the Constitution of the United 
States of America.93 Enumerated natural rights within the Constitution, 
including a prohibition on the deprivation of life, liberty, or property by the 
federal government, absent due process of law, take primacy over both state 
law and federal statute.94 Simply stated, in the event of a conflict, law 
                                                                                                                           
 91. For example, the Court of First Instance of the European Union has addressed the 
discretion reserved within Resolution 1373, in Case T-228/02, Org. des Modjahedines du 
people d’Iran v. Council of the European Union, E.C.R. II-4665 (2006) (finding that 
Resolution 1373 leaves discretion to the Member States in determining procedure and 
designating individuals or entities for sanctions). 
 92. U.N. Charter art. 25 (requiring Member States to “accept and carry out the decisions 
of the Security Council”). 
 93. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 
(1890) (“The treaty power, as expressed in the constitution, is in terms unlimited except by 
those restraints which are found in that instrument against the action of the government or of 
its departments, and those arising from the nature of the government itself and of that of the 
States. It would not be contended that it extends so far as to authorize what the constitution 
forbids, or a change in the character of the government or in that of one of the States, or a 
session of any portion of the territory of the latter, without its consent.”). 
 94. U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law”); Noble v. Union River Logging, 147 U.S. 165 
(1893). This prohibition applies to both persons and corporate entities; Barron v. Baltimore, 
32 U.S. 243 (1833). This constitutional protection binds the federal government, but not 
states. See also Bardo Fassbender, United Nations, Office of Legal Affairs, TARGETED 
SANCTIONS AND DUE PROCESS 9 (2006), (citing the Fifth Amendment as a procedural 
safeguard historically rooted “in the notion that conditions of personal freedom can be 
preserved only when there is some institutional check on arbitrary government action”). 
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outside the Constitution yields to the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution. 
Within the United States Constitution, treaty obligations carry the weight 
and authority of federal statute.95 An international treaty is supreme, insofar 
as it binds national and state courts.96 However, when there is a clash 
between constitutionally guaranteed rights and international obligation, 
courts will apply the Constitution domestically, even if it yields a violation 
of international obligation.97 Thus, treaty obligation within the United 
States Constitution is equal in weight and authority to federal statute, and as 
such, yields to the primacy of constitutionally guaranteed rights.98 
It bears mentioning that within the framework of United States treaty 
obligations, the United Nations Charter is supreme to all other treaty 
obligations.99 While the position of the United States as a party to the 
United Nations Charter accepts the Charter as the supreme treaty above all 
other treaty obligations, the Charter still remains analogous to federal 
statute in the domestic system, and as such, subject to review on 
fundamental Constitutional grounds regardless of the potential risk of 
violating UNC Article 25 in the process. In summation, Security Council 
Resolutions are integrated into the domestic legal order via Executive 
Order. As such, implementation is reviewable by the domestic judiciary on 
constitutional grounds, including a right to due process of law. As such, 
                                                                                                                           
 95. U.S. CONST. art. VI )“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in 
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.”). See also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796) (“[T]reaties which 
were then made, or should thereafter be made, under the authority of the United States, 
should be the supreme law of the land . . . .”); Baker v. City of Portland, 2 F. Cas. 472, 474 
(C.C.D. Or. 1879) (“This treaty . . . is the supreme law of the land, and the courts are bound 
to enforce it fully and fairly. . . . The state cannot legislate so as to interfere with the 
operation of this treaty or limit or deny the privileges and immunities guaranteed by it 
. . . .”). 
 96. Maiorano v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 268, 272-73 (1909) (“A treaty 
. . . by the express words of the Constitution, is the supreme law of the land.”). 
 97. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 509 (2008) (“Indeed, a later-in-time federal statute 
supersedes inconsistent treaty provisions.”) (citing Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 
(1933) (holding that where treaty obligation and federal statute clash, courts will apply the 
Constitution domestically, even if in violation of domestic law)). 
 98. Reid v. Covert, 353 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 99. U.N. Charter art. 103 (“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the 
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any 
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”). 
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domestic review of Resolution 1267 implementation allows an open 
possibility that it may be overruled on domestic constitutional grounds, 
irrespective of a potential transgression under UNC Article 25. 
C. The Promulgation of Domestic Rules and Regulations Pursuant to 
Executive Order 13224 
United States implementation of United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions, including Resolution 1267, are governed by federal statute, 
specifically, the United Nations Participation Act of 1945.100 Rather than 
implement Security Council Resolutions by merely transposing the 
requirements of the Security Council, Resolutions are implemented by the 
President of the United States via an executive act.101  
Domestic implementation of Resolution 1267 is a convoluted affair as it 
combines an order of the executive with an annual presidential declaration 
of national emergency, under the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act IEEPA.102 The IIEPA empowers the President to block a 
variety of transactions, and even prevent humanitarian donations if they are 
determined to risk impairing the ability to deal with a declared 
                                                                                                                           
 100. United Nations Participation Act of 1945, 22 U.S.C. § 287c(a) (2006). 
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, whenever the United States is 
called upon by the Security Council to apply measures which said Council has 
decided, pursuant to article 41 of said Charter, are to be employed to give effect 
to its decisions under said Charter, the President may, to the extent necessary to 
apply such measures, through any agency which he may designate, and under 
such orders, rules, and regulations as may be prescribed by him, investigate, 
regulate, or prohibit, in whole or in part, economic relations or rail, sea, air, 
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication between any 
foreign country or any national thereof or any person therein and the United 
States or any person subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or involving any 
property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 
Id. 
 101. See Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475 (1866) (discussing the nature and effect and 
authority of Executive Orders, andexamining the role of Executive Orders in fulfilling the 
president’s executive role). 
 102. U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1702(a)(1) (2008). This statute authorizes the president “to deal 
with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part 
outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United 
States.” Measures to deal with these threats include prohibiting financial transactions. 50 
U.S.C. § 1622(d) (requiring declaration and publication in the Federal Register within 90 
days before anniversary). The NEA provides presidential declaration of emergencies 
terminates on its anniversary, absent a renewing declaration. Executive Order 13224 
continues to operate based on this annual renewal. 75 Fed. Reg. 55661 (Sept. 10, 2010).  
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emergency.103 Essentially, this declaration of national emergency provides 
the pretext under which the President may act to freeze the assets of 
individuals or entities. 
Executive Order 13224(1) provides that parties will be listed if 
determined “to have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, 
acts of terrorism that threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national 
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States . . . .”104 
“Terrorism” is defined in Executive Order 13224(2)(d).105 
The actual freezing of assets, and subsequent administrative review, is 
performed within the Executive Branch by the Department of the Treasury. 
The Department of the Treasury promulgates rules and regulations, and 
maintains the list of individuals and entities subject to targeted sanctions. 
Specifically, the Office of Foreign Assets Control [OFAC] (part of the 
Treasury) administers the implementation of Executive Order 13224.106 
OFAC listing of Specially Designated Global Terrorists generally lacks 
transparency. In practice, “a number of U.S. agencies, including the 
Treasury, State, Justice, the FBI and the intelligence community, review 
open source and confidential information, including tips and leads, about 
persons and entities who commit, threaten to commit or support 
terrorism.”107  
Information gathered on entities under consideration for listing is then 
reviewed by the National Security Council, which makes a final 
                                                                                                                           
 103. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(2)(A). 
 104. Exec. Order No. 13224(1)(b). 
 105. Exec. Order No. 13224sec. 3 (d)(i–ii) 
(d) the term “terrorism” means an activity that—  
(i) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, property, or 
infrastructure; and  
(ii) appears to be intended— 
(A) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
(B) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;  
(C) or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, 
kidnapping, or hostage-taking. 
 106. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, 
TERRORIST ASSETS REPORT 1 (2007). The OFAC identifies legal persons for designations, 
assists in compliance with sanctions, assesses penalties for violation of sanctions, and 
coordinates internationally to implement targeted sanction strategies. 
 107. Int’l Information Programs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Background on Terror Assets 
Designation Process (Feb. 28, 2002), available at http://usinfo.org/wf-
archive/2002/020228/epf405.htm (last visited July 2, 2011). 
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recommendation for listing to OFAC.108 Despite a number of involved 
agencies, listing and freezing of assets is performed within the Department 
of the Treasury, by the OFAC, in consultation with a range of other 
agencies. Designation as an SDGT (listing under Executive Order 13224) 
results in a prohibition on the transfer of funds to these individuals or 
entities, absent a waiver via license.109  
For the sake of clarity, the implementation of Resolution 1267 warrants a 
brief review. Implementation is handled almost exclusively through the 
Executive Branch of the United States Government via an Executive Order. 
The United States Congress empowers the President to implement Security 
Council Resolutions by virtue of the United Nations Participation Act. It is 
under this authority that the President has issued Executive Order 13224, 
which relies upon the Department of the Treasury (an entity within the 
Executive Branch of government) to list parties and freeze assets. Finally, it 
should be noted that Executive Order 13224 is subject to domestic judicial 
review on Constitutional grounds, including the right to federal due process 
under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
D. Domestic Review under Executive Order 13224 
1. Administrative Review 
Legal entities designated as SDGTs may first challenge their designation 
administratively, by submitting a request for removal, including a written 
statement as to the nature of the supposed error.110 Administrative review is 
distinct from judicial review as it is performed within the Department of the 
Treasury (specifically the OFAC). Pursuant to 31 C.F.R. § 501.807, a 
“person may seek administrative reconsideration of his, her or its 
                                                                                                                           
 108. The National Security Council is the President’s principal forum for considering 
national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and 
cabinet officials. National Security Council, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
administration/eop/nsc (last visited July 2, 2011); Int’l Information Programs, supra note 
107.  
 109. Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 594.202(a)–(d), 595.202(a)–
(d) (2004) (permitting collection for lawful payments owed by a designated legal person via 
the issuance of a license). 
 110. Procedures for Unblocking Funds Believed to Have Been Blocked Due to Mistaken 
Identity, 31 C.F.R. §§ 501.806–807 (2008). For a detailed appraisal of the functions of 
administrative review in the United States legal system, see JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE 
PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985); MICHAEL HEAD, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: 
CONTEXT AND CRITIQUE (2d ed. 2008). 
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designation . . . and thus seek to have the designation rescinded.”111 This 
regulation permits the listed person to “submit arguments or evidence that 
the person believes establishes that insufficient basis exists for the 
designation.”112 In addition, a designated SDGT is entitled to request an 
administrative hearing,113 and receive a written determination of a request 
for reconsideration.114 
During this process, a listed party may request a meeting with OFAC for 
a review of its listing, but these meetings are not as of right, and are not 
required.115 Thus, listed parties are not entitled to a hearing before an 
administrative judge where they can offer evidence.116 In addition, the 
quality of evidence relied upon in listing and freezing assets may include a 
variety of sources that would not suffice at a proper trial.117 
Perhaps the most disconcerting feature of administrative review remains 
its secretive nature. While the United States will issue written 
administrative determinations to those challenging SDGT designation, it 
continues to avoid disclosure of the actual evidence relevant to the SDGT’s 
designation.118 
2.  Independent Judicial Review 
After administrative remedies are exhausted, judicial review is available 
in federal court, including a hearing with full trial rights.119 As discussed 
                                                                                                                           
 111. Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F. Supp. 2d 64, 71 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 112. Id. (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies). 
 113. 31 C.F.R. § 501.807(c). 
 114. 31 C.F.R. § 501.807(d).  
 115. 31 C.F.R. §§ 501.806–807 (2004). 
 116. 31 C.F.R. § 501.807. 
 117. John D. Cline, The President’s Power to Seize Property in the Post-September 11 
World: The International Emergency Economic Powers Act, CHAMPION, Oct. 2003, at 19 
(noting that the sources include media reports, statements by anonymous informants, and 
intelligence reports from foreign countries, which may contain hearsay and speculation). 
 118. See, e.g., Serge Schmemann, A Nation Challenged: Sanctions and Fallout; Swedes 
Take Up the Cause of 3 on U.S. Terror List, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2002, at A9 (discussing 
Swedish frustrations with the listing of its nationals on the 1267 Consolidated List, by the 
United States, in the absence of sharing evidence). 
 119. Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F. Supp. 2d 64, 71 (D.D.C. 2008) (inferring a requirement 
to exhaust administrative review prior to seeking judicial review); U.S. Const. amend. VII 
(“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the 
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re- 
examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common 
law.”). 
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above, federal due process standards contained within the United States 
Constitution govern due process challenges to listing. Analysis of the 
judgments challenging the implementation of Executive Order 13224 
reveals a relatively low bar for sufficient due process, a general deference 
to the administrative process, and a markedly dualist and domestically 
minded approach. In reviewing challenges of those simultaneously listed 
under Resolution 1267 and Executive Order 13224, federal courts have not 
alluded to Resolution 1267, jus cogens, nor acknowledged obligations 
under UNC Article 25. Instead, courts have favored review on solely 
domestic constitutional grounds. In addition, challenges brought in federal 
courts have had the convenience of hearing parties that were originally 
suggested to the Resolution 1267 committee by the United States. This has 
proven to be of great convenience in conferring the ability for the courts to 
engage in substantive review of grounds for listing SDGTs without needing 
to rely on foreign states to provide evidence. As logic would dictate, parties 
listed by the United States are suggested based on evidence to which the 
government of the United States is privy. This puts reviewing courts in a 
position to review claims on the individual merits, rather than merely 
engage the methods of implementation.120 
Of the domestic cases challenging the asset freezing of Executive Order 
13224, no party has succeeded on constitutional due process grounds, 
including three cases that reviewed the asset freezing of individuals 
simultaneously present on the Executive Order 13224 list and the 
Resolution 1267 Consolidated List.121 A review of case law demonstrates 
domestic due process standards comport with the implementation of 
Resolution 1267. In assessing the security stakes involved in pre-
designation notice, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals described such 
notice as a “suicide pact.”122 This proclamation of a so-called “suicide pact” 
is bolstered by the argument that prior notice would permit listed 
organizations to move funds prior to freezing.123 
                                                                                                                           
 120. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. 
Council & Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R I-6351 (noting that in the absence of available substantive 
evidence to support listing, the ECJ was limited to evaluating the legality of regulations 
implementing Resolution 1267); see supra Part III. 
 121. At the district level, these cases are: Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Treasury, 585 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (D. Or. 2008); Paulson, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 72; Global 
Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
 122. Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O’Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2002) (describing 
pre-designation notice as a “suicide pact” (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 
144, 160 (1963))). 
 123. Id. at 754. 
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Appealing to the urgency of security, it has been held constitutional for 
Executive Order 13224 to merely provide post-deprivation notice and 
hearing. In addition, post-deprivation notice has been ruled sufficient where 
the Department of the Treasury posts a press release serving as notice of the 
deprivation on its website.124 Review of evidence in camera has also been 
upheld as constitutional.125 Taken in their totality, these decisions 
demonstrate a willingness to sacrifice the due process protection of 
individuals in favor of a need for security and the confidentiality of 
sensitive intelligence. 
In Holy Land Foundation v. Ashcroft, justification for the due process 
afforded, namely the lack of a pre-deprivation notice and hearing, was 
stated as follows: 
(1) the deprivation was necessary to secure an important 
governmental interest; (2) there has been a special need for very 
prompt action; and (3) the party initiating the deprivation was a 
government official responsible for determining, under the 
standards, of a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and 
justified in the particular instance.126 
The list designating SDGTs under Executive Order 13224 includes 
individuals and entities beyond the Consolidated List under Resolution 
1267. Consequently, individuals challenging their domestic listing under 
Executive Order 13224, may not even be listed on the Security Council’s 
Consolidated List. Thus far, there have been instances where entities 
simultaneously sanctioned under the Executive Order 13224 and listed 
under Resolution 1267 have challenged their designation in the federal 
courts of the United States. In the three cases discussed below, not one 
mention of Resolution 1267 is made in the federal jurisprudence in 
analyzing the domestic implementation of Resolution 1267, nor is there a 
single mention of jus cogens norms. Rather, these cases are reviewed on 
purely domestic constitutional grounds. In reviewing the claims, courts 
have had access to substantive evidence by virtue of the United States 
                                                                                                                           
 124. Paulson, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 71. 
 125. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 164 (D.C. Cir. 
2003). 
 126. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 76 (D.D.C. 
2002). Although the petitioner in Holy Land is not present on the Consolidated List for 
Resolution 1267, its challenge is analogous to the domestic challenge of any other party 
listed under regulatory regime created by Executive Order 13224. The Consolidated List, 
supra note 18. 
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undertaking the initial listing of these parties domestically, and then 
recommending their listing to the Resolution 1267 committee. The 
availability of such evidence has facilitated review on the merits, even if 
evidence is heard in camera. This is a luxury not afforded to legal orders 
that may be reviewing a claim from a party that it had not initially listed, 
and may lack access to a substantive justification for listing under 
Resolution 1267. 
The Global Relief Foundation, a charity organization listed by the United 
States Department of the Treasury on October 18, 2002, and listed on the 
1267 Consolidated list on October 22, 2002 challenged its designation 
domestically.127 Ultimately, on appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals, the court upheld the designation, while further finding that the 
consideration of ex parte evidence, and the lack of pre-deprivation hearing 
were constitutional.128 
Aqeel Abdulaziz Al-Aqeel, listed by the United States Department of the 
Treasury on June 2, 2004, and listed on the 1267 Consolidated list on July 
6, 2004 challenged his designation domestically.129 The Al-Aqeel court 
upheld the listing, validating the lack of a pre-designation process and ex 
parte in camera review, while requiring an exhaustion of administrative 
remedies.130 The court further found the post-designation process to be 
compliant with the requirements of due process under the Fifth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution.131 
Saudi-based charity, Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, was targeted for 
sanctions by the United States on September 9, 2004.132 The U.S.-based 
branch of Al Haramain Foundation was then listed on the Resolution 1267  
 
                                                                                                                           
 127. The Consolidated List, supra note 18; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
Treasury Department Statement Regarding the Designation of the Global Relief Foundation 
(Oct. 18, 2002), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/po3553.aspx.  
 128. O’Neill, 315 F.3d at 754. 
 129. The Consolidated List, supra note 18; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
Additional Al-Haramain Branches, Former Leader Designated by Treasury as Al Qaida 
Supporters Treasury Marks Latest Action in Joint Designation with Saudi Arabia (June 2, 
2004), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js1703.aspx. 
 130. Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F. Supp. 2d 64, 72 (D. D.C. 2008). 
 131. Id. at 71. 
 132. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, U.S.-Based Branch of Al Haramain 
Foundation Linked to Terror Treasury Designates U.S. Branch Director (Sept. 9, 2004), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/ js1895.aspx. 
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Consolidated List on September 28, 2004.133 Like Al-Aqeel and Global 
Relief Foundation, the court in Al Haramain found sufficient due process 
was satisfied within the Executive Order 13224 Regime.134 
In their totality, Al-Aqeel, Global Relief Foundation, and Al Haramain 
have amounted to an indirect review of Resolution 1267. In theory, the 
United States could be in violation of UNC Article 25. However, this has 
not yet happened. 
The availability of substantive evidence for review warrants mention. 
The United States could hypothetically lack compelling substantive 
evidence to support its deprivation of due process in reviewing claims by 
parties brought in the future; particularly, parties that the United States did 
not initially request for listing to the 1267 Committee. While this has not 
yet occurred, it could provide a scenario where those conducting 
administrative and judicial review would be tasked with reconciling 
national due process standards with potentially deficient supporting 
substantive evidence.135 This could further entail the potential infeasibility 
of unilaterally offering redress to the listed party.136 The value of 
substantive evidence for supporting listing cannot be understated, as it risks 
limiting the scope of review by courts considerably. Notably, in deciding 
Kadi, the Court of First Instance and European Court of Justice were 
incapable of truly evaluating the substantive merits of listing, due to the 
absence of actual records and evidence justifying a listing that was initiated 
by a party outside of their legal order (in that case, the United States).137 
Critics of the Resolution 1267 Regime have acknowledged the potential 
for regional and national court judgments to challenge Security Council 
sanctions, potentially overturning implementation.138 While these 
eventualities have been realized in other legal orders, practice within the 
United States remains both dualist and compliant, as indirect judicial 
                                                                                                                           
 133. The Consolidated List, supra note 18. 
 134. Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 585 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 
1254 (D. Or. 2008) (holding that the legal entity listed was afforded sufficient due process 
for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment). 
 135. See supra Part II. 
 136. See supra Part III. 
 137. Case T-306/01, Yusuf & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council and Comm’n, 2005 
E.C.R. II-3533, ¶ 191; Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649; 
Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council & Comm’n, 
2008 E.C.R I-635 (annulling EC regulations implementing Resolution 1267, the court 
effectively claimed a right to review the substantive evidence listees as part of affording an 
effective remedy). 
 138. WATSON INSTITUTE, supra note 20, at 7-8.  
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review of Resolution 1267 implementation has yet to run afoul of 
obligations under Article 25 of the United Nations Charter. 
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF DUALIST IMPLEMENTATION  
OF RESOLUTION 1267 
A. Domestic Legitimacy Vested through Greater Legal Process 
1. Legitimacy Through Judicial Procedure 
Central to the criticism of the 1267 Regime is a persistent perception of 
unfairness, including displeasure with due process standards.139 The United 
Nations Office of Legal Affairs has further cited a lack of transparency and 
accessibility as threats to the credibility and effectiveness of the Resolution 
1267 Regime.140 Even if the 1267 Committee procedures have improved, 
including the appointment of an Ombudsperson, the body of evidence relied 
upon in listing remains largely confidential, and delisting requests continue 
to lack independent judicial review. 
In distinguishing United Nations practice under Resolution 1267 from 
domestic practice under Executive Order 13224, the repeated lack of 
successful challenges to listing in the United States reflects continued 
harmony with the Security Council, while simultaneously affording 
substantially greater process than that offered by the United Nations. The 
quality of review in the United States has further been contingent on the 
fact that challenging parties were originally listed by the 1267 Committee 
pursuant to the request of the United States. This creates a scenario where 
the United States may reference and consider substantive evidence in a 
domestic challenge to listing that may otherwise be unavailable to other 
countries within the Resolution 1267 Regime.141 
While the appointment of the Ombudsperson at the United Nations level 
acts to increase communication and transparency, it is not a substitute for 
independent judicial review. Challenging listing under Executive Order 
13224 combines an initial administrative process with an opportunity for 
judicial review that is absent within the United Nations. In the United 
States, the quality of due process has generally yielded to the urgency of 
security interests. Significant hurdles for any claimant include the 
                                                                                                                           
 139. Id. at 7. 
 140. FASSBENDER, supra note 94, at 5-6. 
 141. By virtue of the fact that parties challenging listing domestically within the United 
States were initially listed by the United States. A notable distinction from the Kadi case. 
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constitutionality of denying pre-deprivation hearing, the admission of in 
camera evidence, and the broad deference afforded by federal judges to 
administrative findings.142 While the outcomes for those challenging listing 
domestically have not favored the claimants, the greater quality of process 
provided for in the United States vests asset freezing within the United 
States with an arguably greater level of legitimacy. 
Specifically, challenging Executive Order 13224 within the federal 
courts of the United States is at minimum, regardless of outcome, 
independent judicial review.143 This is in stark contrast to United Nations 
practice where delisting challenges lack independent judicial review, 
instead falling under the auspices of the Security Council, both the 
promulgating and reviewing power under Resolution 1267.144 
In essence, the argument can be made that independent review is process 
that equates to substance, vesting challenges to terror asset freezing with 
legitimacy. The United Nations’s current review process simply cannot 
match that of the United States, absent creation of its own independent 
judicial framework.145 This notion that subjective perceptions of legitimacy 
                                                                                                                           
 142. See, e.g., Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 68, 
76 (D.D.C. 2002); Global Relief Found., Inc., v. O’Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779, 808 (N.D. Ill. 
2002); Nicole Nice-Petersen, Justice for the “Designated”: The Process that is due to 
Alleged U.S. Financiers of Terrorism, 93 GEO. L. J. 1387, 1388 (2005) (noting that exigent 
security circumstances result in greater deference to the Executive); Robert E. O’Leary, 
Improving the Terrorist Finance Sanctions Process, 42 N.Y.U. INT’L L. POL. 563 (2010) 
(“Under the current process, judicial review is ‘essentially futile’ since courts use the 
arbitrary and capricious standard of review and give extreme deference to executive actions 
related to national security and foreign policy.” (citing Danielle Stampley, Comment, 
Blocking Access to Assets: Compromising Civil Rights to Protect National Security or 
Unconstitutional Infringement on Due Process and the Right to Hire an Attorney?, 57 AM. 
U. L. REV. 683, 719-20 (2008))). 
 143. U.S. Const. art. III (establishing a Judicial Branch, independent from the Executive 
Branch tasked with implementing Resolution 1267). 
 144. Review is conducted by the Resolution 1267 Committee, a subsidiary body of the 
United Nations Security Council, composed of Security Council members. Committee 
Guidelines, supra note 22, ¶ 7; 
Direct[ing] the [1267] Committee to continue to work, in accordance with its 
guidelines, to consider delisting requests of Member States for the removal 
from the Consolidated List of members and/or associates of Al-Qaida, Usama 
bin Laden, or the Taliban who no longer meet the criteria established in the 
relevant resolutions, which shall be placed on the Committee’s agenda upon 
request of a member of the Committee. . . . 
S.C. Res. 1904, ¶ 22 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1904 (Dec. 17, 2009). 
 145. The creation of a judicial review mechanism has been explored by commentators. 
See, e.g., Jared Genser & Kate Barth, When Due Process Become Dangerous: The Security 
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are rooted in procedural or substantive processes is neither new, nor novel, 
but is clearly applicable to the Resolution 1267 Regime.146 While the 
prospect falls outside the scope of this article, it also bears mentioning that 
any court created within, or parallel to the Security Council poses 
significant challenges within the United Nations legal order. In addition, 
should the Security Council decide to create a court, this fledgling tribunal 
would likely lack the established procedural processes, jurisprudence, and 
perceived legitimacy of a long functioning national legal order. A newly 
established international legal framework would face obstacles stemming 
from an ongoing resistance of states to share substantive evidence in the 
form of sensitive intelligence. This issue of available substantive evidence 
continues to restrict and complicate review of Resolution 1267 related 
listing at the 1267 Committee, and would likely continue to complicate 
matters should a tribunal be established. While the availability of 
substantive evidence also affects review within regional or national legal 
orders, review within the United States has not been profoundly hindered 
thus far. 
While review of implementing measures in United States courts risks 
potential conflicts with obligations under UNC Article 25, its ability to vest 
the otherwise extra-legal processes of Resolution 1267 with the legitimacy 
of a proper hearing from an independent judiciary, at minimum, aids the 
legitimacy and transparency of Resolution 1267’s domestic 
implementation. 
2. Access to Substantive Evidence in Domestic Review as a Unique 
 Convenience 
The legitimacy of domestic implementation of Resolution 1267 within 
the national legal order of the United States is further bolstered by a feature 
critical to courtroom challenges thus far. Those challenging listing in the 
                                                                                                                           
Council 1267 Regime and the Need for Reform, 33 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2010) 
(proposing the creation of an independent tribunal with the power to hear delisting requests 
and issue binding delisting decisions); Michael Bothe, Security Council’s Targeted 
Sanctions Against Presumed Terrorists, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 541, 553 (2008) (“It is 
somewhat difficult to imagine the Security Council establishing an independent tribunal to 
review its decisions.”). 
 146. Ian Johnstone, Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Council: Bringing 
Down the Deliberative Deficit, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 275, 277 (2008) (“Thomas Franck, for 
example, presents a subjective concept of legitimacy that turns on the perceptions, beliefs, 
and expectations of those to whom the rules are addressed. Rules that are perceived as both 
procedurally and substantively just exert a compliance pull on states, even in the absence of 
enforcement.” (citing THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INSTITUTIONS (1995))). 
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United States were actually listed domestically and subsequently 
recommended for listing to the Resolution 1267 Committee by the United 
States. 
While evidence may remain secret and reviewed in camera by United 
States courts, the potential for a domestic court to substantively review 
evidence is somewhat novel under Resolution 1267. Substantive review has 
occurred in cases challenging implementation of Resolution 1267 under 
Executive Order 13244 by virtue of the United States having originally 
listed the claimant parties. As a consequence of this initial domestic listing, 
and subsequent recommendation for addition to the Consolidated List by 
the United States, substantive evidence is available to the government in 
reviewing claims. In comparison, a legal order that is not responsible for an 
initial listing may enter into an untenable position should a national 
challenge their placement on the Consolidated List in a national court. 
Under this scenario, it is possible that a national court may have limited, if 
any, access to substantive evidence justifying placement on the 
Consolidated List. As such, a court may have little, if any capability to 
review the substantive merits of a claim. 
In the United States, there has not yet been a challenge by a party that 
was not approved for domestic listing prior to appearance on the Resolution 
1267 Consolidated List. Should such a scenario arise, a court may struggle 
with assessing substantive evidence to support listing, absent adequate 
intelligence collection, or sufficient cooperation in receiving evidence from 
a state initially advocating the listing. For now, the availability of 
substantive evidence to domestic courts remains a convenience afforded to 
the United States that the European Court of Justice notably lacked in 
rendering the Kadi judgment.147 In fact, the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) in Kadi was limited to annulling regulations implementing 
Resolution 1267, rather than providing substantive review, due to a lack of 
available evidence justifying listing. Simply stated, the ECJ’s approach was 
limited, as it could not review the merits of substantive evidence to which it 
lacks access. 
Ultimately, the prospect of a domestic case in the United States where 
there is insufficient evidence available to justify listing remains uncertain. 
The likelihood of a substantive lack of evidence is not ascertainable and 
remains contingent on United States intelligence and information gathering 
                                                                                                                           
 147. See Case T-306/01, Yusuf & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council and Comm’n, 
2005 E.C.R. II-3533, ¶ 319; Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-
3649; Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council & 
Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R I-6351, ¶ 378 (annulling regulations implementing Resolution 1267). 
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for parties present on the Consolidated List. Given governmental secrecy, it 
is difficult to ascertain the scope and availability of intelligence justifying 
listing for these parties. Finally, should review be undertaken without 
sufficient evidence to render a judgment against the claimant, a domestic 
court could potentially rule implementation under Executive Order 13224 
as unconstitutional, and as such, invalid. This would likely lead to an 
outcome contravening the requirements of Resolution 1267, culminating in 
a violation of international obligation under Article 25 of the United 
Nations Charter. 
While dualist implementation of Resolution 1267 by the United States 
risks consequent conflict with Security Council primacy, the retention of 
autonomous discretion has actually remained harmonious while vesting 
domestic implementation of Resolution 1267 with a legitimacy lacking in 
United Nations practice. A formal hearing, testimony, the taking of 
evidence, established procedural rules, and judges independent of the 
implementing body, provide a quality of process, legitimacy and 
transparency to Executive Order 13224 simply lacking at the Security 
Council level. Thus far, United States practice implementing the Resolution 
1267 Regime has managed to comply with UNC Article 25 while vesting 
targeted sanctions with enhanced transparency, more defined procedure, 
and independent judicial review, further legitimizing targeted sanctions. 
B. Shifting the Burden for Reform: The International Implications of 
Dualist Implementation 
While dualist implementation has vested Resolution 1267 with 
legitimacy within the constitutional framework of the United States, 
implementation outside the United States has not been as harmonious with 
regional or national due process standards.148 In contrast to the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ, challenges in the United States have neither 
annulled implementation, nor evaluated asset freezing in the broader 
                                                                                                                           
 148. See, e.g., Case T-306/01, Yusuf & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council and 
Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-3533; Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. 
II-3649; Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council & 
Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R I-6351; U.N. Human Rights Comm., Sayadi v. Belgium, Commc’n 
No. 1472/2006, ¶ 2.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006 (2008) (noting that the 
proceedings were brought before the UNHRC after the domestic proceedings found due 
process violations, but was unable to afford a suitable remedy). Given the proclaimed 
perpetual nature of the so-called “War of Terror,” this remains a future possibility, should 
Resolution 1267 continue to operate for an extended period, or in perpetuity. 
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context of an obligation to the Security Council or United Nations 
Charter.149 
The standards for due process afforded under Resolution 1267 have 
proven harmonious under judicial scrutiny in the United States. This is 
indicative, at minimum, of successful vetting of Resolution 1267’s 
requirements prior to passage, specifically the notion that its requirements 
would be constitutionally sound. In actuality, Resolution 1267 and the 
consequent Executive Order 13224 are not even novel within the legal 
order of the United States, as evidenced by a previous domestic sanctions 
regime instituted during the Clinton Administration for the freezing of 
terror related assets.150 The Clinton Administration, like the Bush 
Administration,151 exercised executive powers under the IEEPA to freeze 
assets of individuals, including terrorists attempting to interfere in the 
Middle East peace process.152 Like Executive Order 13224, the Clinton 
Administration implementation of Executive Order 12947 targeted 
individuals and entities, affording similar procedural and due process 
protections. Thus far, the United States appears to have sacrificed little, if 
                                                                                                                           
 149. See, e.g., Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F. Supp. 2d 64, 71-72 (D.D.C. 2008); Al 
Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 585 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (D. Or. 
2008); Al-Aqeel v. Paulson, 568 F. Supp. 2d 64, 72 (D. D.C. 2008); Global Relief Found., 
Inc. v. O’Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779 (N.D. Ill. 2002);  
The most highly visible and significant decision to date was made by the 
highest court in the European Union, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), 
which decided in favor of two legal challenges on 3 September 2008 and 
annulled the European Union regulation implementing UNSCR 1267 with 
specific reference to the two cases. In its judgments in the cases of Kadi and Al 
Barakaat (joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P), the Court distinguished 
between the imposition of the sanctions by the 1267 Committee and the 
implementation of the sanctions at the EU level, holding that the latter are 
bound by fundamental rights when implementing the sanctions, and that 
therefore they must ensure that the persons affected have the right to be 
informed of the reasons for their listing and the right to contest those reasons 
before an independent body. 
BIERSTEKER & ECKERT, supra note 4, at 7-8. 
 150. Exec. Order No. 12,947, 3 C.F.R. 319 (1995); see also Exec. Order No. 12,978, 60 
Fed. Reg. 54, 579 (Oct. 21, 1995) (noting the title of the order “Blocking Assets and 
Prohibiting Transactions with Significant Narcotics Traffickers”). 
 151. The administration of George W. Bush (2001-2009). 
 152. Exec. Order No. 12,947, 3 C.F.R. 319 (1995). 
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any, due process protection, which it would have otherwise favored in the 
absence of Resolution 1267.153 
While outcomes have not been positive for those challenging their listing 
domestically, access to domestic review of substantive evidence has 
afforded greater protections than at the United Nations. While domestic 
administrative review lacks transparency, the federal judiciary continues to 
grant great deference to administrative findings.154 Even if the prospects for 
a successful challenge to Executive Order 13224 appear remote, there is 
certainly legitimacy to be derived from formal hearings and substantive 
review.  
In reviewing struggles with implementation within other legal orders, 
especially within the European Union, the quality of process and potential 
for competent review, flowing from Resolution 1267, has proven 
troublesome outside the United States. This has essentially created a 
scenario where Member States, or in the case of the EU, a regional order 
that is not a “Member State,” must embrace a nationally or regionally 
deficient due process standard, or come into conflict with the Resolution 
1267 Regime. 
Thus, United States influence in establishing the Resolution 1267 
Regime, suggests a scenario where if not for harmonious due process 
standards, the Resolution would have been subject to veto in the Security 
Council. In voting for passage of Resolution 1267, the United States 
demonstrated acquiescence to standards capable of harmonious domestic 
implementation. In comparison to United States dualism, the approach of 
the EC diverges greatly, as implementation within the regional legal order 
amounts to an “automatic transposition of any list of persons or entities 
drawn up by the Sanctions Committee in accordance with the applicable 
                                                                                                                           
 153. Compare Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 25, 2001) with Exec. 
Order No. 12,947, 3 C.F.R. 319 (1995). 
 154. See, e.g., Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 76 
(D.D.C. 2002); O’Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 808; Paulson, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 71-72; Al 
Haramain Islamic Found. Inc, 585 F. Supp. 2d 1233; Nice-Petersen, supra note 142, at 1388 
(noting that exigent security circumstances result in greater deference to the Executive); 
O’Leary, supra note 142, at 563 (“Under the current process, judicial review is “essentially 
futile” since courts use the arbitrary and capricious standard of review and give extreme 
deference to executive actions related to national security and foreign policy.” (citing 
Danielle Stampley, Comment, Blocking Access to Assets: Compromising Civil Rights to 
Protect National Security or Unconstitutional Infringement on Due Process and the Right to 
Hire an Attorney?, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 683, 719-20 (2008))). 
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procedures, without any autonomous discretion whatsoever being 
exercised. . . .”155 
In practice, EC implementation has diverged from United States practice 
as the EC ceded the prospect for autonomous review via monist 
implementation while apparently maintaining a higher standard of due 
process, and lacking access to sufficient substantive evidence justifying the 
listing of claimant parties. While the Court of First Instance reiterated the 
transpositional nature of Resolution 1267 implementation, this tension 
between a lack of autonomous review and due process requirements is 
evident in the ECJ’s annulment of regulations implementing Resolution 
1267 in the Kadi & Al Barakaat International Foundation.156 
In the United States, implementation of Resolution 1267 through 
Executive Order separates domestic law from international obligation, 
resulting in the retention of autonomous review. While judiciaries outside 
of the United States have demonstrated a willingness to engage, or at least 
acknowledge root international obligations associated with the Resolution 
1267 Regime, the United States has remained compliant with Resolution 
1267 while generally omitting even and acknowledgment of the United 
Nations or the Security Council in its jurisprudence.157 
Prior to challenges to implementation of Security Resolution 1267 within 
the EU, the European Court of Human Rights had declared “the [European] 
Convention [on Human Rights] cannot be interpreted in a manner which 
would subject the acts and omissions of contracting parties, which are 
covered by UNSC Resolutions and occur prior to or in the course of such 
missions, to the scrutiny of the Court.” 158 This willingness to subordinate a 
regional order to the supremacy of the United Nations Charter has 
apparently yielded in response to the challenges under the Resolution 1267 
                                                                                                                           
 155. Case T-306/01, Yusuf & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council and Comm’n, 2005 
E.C.R. II-3533, ¶ 214 (discussing Resolution 1267 implementation via Regulation 
[881/2002]). 
 156. Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05P, Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council & 
Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R I-6351, ¶ 378. 
 157. Compare Paulson, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 71-72; Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc., 585 
F. Supp. 2d 1233; O’Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779 (avoiding discussion of international 
obligation) with Case T-306/01, 2005 E.C.R. II-3533; Case T-315/01, Kadi v. Council and 
Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649; Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05P, 2008 E.C.R I-6351; (In re 
Al-Jedda) v. Sec’y of State for Def., [2007] UKHL 58, [2008] 1 A.C. 332; Abdelrazik v. 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, [2009] F.C. 580 (Can.). 
 158. Behrami v. France, Saramati v. France, App. Nos. 71412/01, 78166/01, 45 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. SE10 (2007), ¶ 149. 
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Regime. Such is the case in Kadi.159 In Kadi, the ECJ annulled the 
European Community’s implementation of the Resolution 1267 Regime, 
ruling that it violated EU norms for fair procedure and protection of 
property.160 It has been claimed that this pluralistic approach stands as a 
challenge to the supremacy of the United Nations Security Council, while 
further placing a burden upon the Security Council to further reform 
Resolution 1267 Regime.161 
While the full implications posed by Kadi to the EC legal order fall 
outside the scope of this article, the annulment of the relevant implementing 
regulations is demonstrative of the difficulties posed by the perceived 
unsuitable quality of due process currently afforded by Resolution 1267. 
The approach of the ECJ in annulling regulations, rather than engaging in 
substantive review of the reasons for listing, further demonstrates the 
continued issue of access to evidence posed by the secretive nature of 
Resolution 1267 listing practices. This issue of deficient evidence has not 
yet arisen in reviewing listing within the United States, partly due to the 
convenience that claimant-parties have all been recommended for listing by 
the United States, suggesting the availability of a body of intelligence 
justifying listing that may not be otherwise widely shared within the 
Resolution 1267 Regime. 
In the absence of a challenge to Security Council primacy by the United 
States, the greatest challenges to Security Council authority and pressure to 
reform the Resolution 1267 Regime has emerged from a legal order that 
implements Security Council resolutions in a monist fashion. While the EC 
is itself a creature of international law and an entity that has historically 
taken international obligations quite seriously, its response to Resolution 
1267 in Kadi proves to be sharply dualist.162 As has been recently asserted, 
                                                                                                                           
 159. Case T-306/01, 2005 E.C.R. II-3533; Case T-315/01, 2005 E.C.R. II-3649; Joined 
Cases C-402 & 415/05P, 2008 E.C.R I-6351. See generally Gráinne de Búrca, The European 
Court of Justice and the International Order After Kadi, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2010) 
(giving an extensive analysis of the post Kadi legal order). 
 160. Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05P, 2008 E.C.R I-6351. 
 161. de Búrca, supra note 159, at 5 n.17 (“Others may view [Kadi] as a message from the 
ECJ to the U.N. Security Council about the need for reform of the sanctions regime.”); id. at 
49 (“[T]he ECJ has chosen to use the much-anticipated Kadi ruling as the occasion to 
proclaim the primacy of its internal constitutional values over the norms of international 
law.”). 
 162. Fiona de Londras & Suzanne Kingston, Rights, Security, and Conflicting 
International Obligations: Exploring Inter-Jurisdictional Judicial Dialogues in Europe, 58 
A. J. COMP. L. 359, 402 (2010) (“Although the Community was treaty-based, and thus 
ostensibly a typical creature of international law, the ECJ lost no time in unilaterally 
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in rendering Kadi, the ECJ risks undermining its long held image as a 
virtuous international actor committed to international law, while further 
challenging the primacy of the United Nations Security Council.163 
In advocating for, and subsequently implementing Resolution 1267 
domestically, the United States embraced a regime with little likelihood of 
conflict with domestic due process standards, creating a scenario where the 
pressure for reform has emerged from a legal order that typically takes a 
more mindful approach to international obligations. This has further created 
a situation where dualist implementation, that largely avoids articulating 
any direct responsibility to the Security Council, has permitted for more 
adherent practice under Resolution 1267 than that of a legal order willing to 
transpose Security Council Resolutions. The United States remains dualist 
yet compliant, while EC implementation and subsequent review is initially 
monist, and ultimately, in conflict with the primacy of the Security Council.  
While the United States is not always regarded as a model citizen within 
the international community, its compliance under Resolution 1267 may 
cast it as such in the narrow context of targeted sanctions. In contrast, and 
in consideration of the Kadi case and the annulment of EC implementing 
regulations, a legal order traditionally adherent to international obligations 
appears unintuitively out of step with the Security Council. However, a 
survey of the broader landscape suggests that Resolution 1267 is a burden 
on civil liberties, which the United States may be more willing to bear in 
comparison to other legal orders. In addition, the argument can be made 
that the legitimacy vested through independent judicial review, and 
accessibility to substantive evidence thus far, makes this burden more 
bearable than within other legal orders. In advocating for and willingly 
shouldering this burden, the United States has essentially shifted the 
demand for reform to the 1267 Regime to legal orders that favor greater 
protection for listed individuals.164 
                                                                                                                           
declaring that the EEC Treaty was no ‘ordinary’ international treaty. . .”); de Búrca, supra 
note 159, at 3-4 (“It is all the more remarkable that a major judgment about the role of 
international law, which expresses important parts of its reasoning in chauvinist and 
parochial tones, was delivered not by a powerful nation-state, but by an international 
organization, which is itself a creature of international law.”). 
 163. de Búrca, supra note 159, at 1 (“[T]he ECJ’s approach risks undermining the image 
the EU has sought to create for itself as a virtuous international actor maintaining a 
distinctive commitment to international law and institutions.”). 
 164. This protection should be considered in an overall empirical manner, irrespective of 
a willingness to domestically review challenges to listing. With regard to a perceived 
mounting urgency for reform, see Christopher Michaelsen, The Security Council’s Practice 
of Blacklisting Alleged Terrorists and Associates: Rule of Law Concerns and Prospects for 
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V. RESOLUTION 1267 AS A RESTRAINT ON UNITED STATES 
UNILATERALISM 
A. International Obligation as a Limitation on Domestic Redress When in 
Compliance with Resolution 1267 
In comparison to Resolution 1373, Resolution 1267 carries strict 
implementation requirements, resulting in a restriction on unilateral 
capacity to remove individuals and entities from the Consolidated List. 
States must freeze assets in accordance with the Consolidated List or risk 
violation of Charter Obligations under Article 25.165 Even if a state 
unilaterally acts to unfreeze assets, in violation of Resolution 1267, the 
success of this unilateral action is logistically hampered by other states 
remaining observant of Resolution 1267.166 
B. Sayadi and the Human Rights Concerns of Limited Redress 
Domestic claims launched within the United States, challenging listing 
and asset freezing under Executive Order 13224, have been unsuccessful 
thus far. Should a party eventually succeed, the viability of a remedy 
outside of successful lobbying for delisting by the 1267 Committee may 
prove elusive. While the domestic legal order of the United States may be 
poised to violate obligations under Article 25 of the United Nations Charter, 
the scope of remedy afforded by the United States is practically limited to 
unfreezing only the assets that it controls. The United States may opt to 
unfreeze the assets of a listed individual unilaterally, but may find itself 
beholden to other states in order to perform such a feat. 
Since the creation of Resolution 1267’s Consolidated List, over five 
hundred individuals or entities have been listed.167 Those subjected to asset 
                                                                                                                           
Reform, 8 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT’L L. 71 (2010) (arguing that a lack of political will among U.N. 
Member States in the Security Council has so far prevented comprehensive reform, but the 
need for reform is becoming increasingly urgent). 
 165. U.N. Charter art. 25 (“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry 
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”). 
 166. Article 25 of the United Nations Charter requires Member States to carry out 
Resolution 1267 in accordance with the Security Council. In addition, obligations under the 
United Nations Charter are supreme to all other treaty obligations of Member States. U.N. 
Charter arts. 25; id. at 103 (“In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the 
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any 
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”). 
 167. The Consolidated List, supra note 18 (noting that of the over 500 listed parties, 
approximately 100 are entities, the rest are individuals). 
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freezing have not only been deprived absent pre-designation hearing and 
notice, they are often minimally informed of the facts leading to their 
listing.168 
In practice, extralegal processes are ultimately governed by political 
wrangling and negotiation, rather than review based in a discernible legal 
process. Listed parties have relied heavily on the willingness of their state 
of residence or citizenship to advocate on their behalf in achieving an 
agreement for removal from the Consolidated List.169 
These tensions are evident in the case with Nabil Sayadi and his 
wife/secretary Patricia Vinck. Sayadi, a Lebanese born resident of Belgium, 
founded and directed the European branch of the Global Relief Foundation. 
The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation accused this Islamic 
charity of having ties to terrorist cells.170 When Belgium provided their 
names to the Resolution 1267 Committee for listing, neither had been 
arrested nor convicted of any terror-related offense. Moreover, at the time 
of Sayadi’s listing, only states could petition for delisting. What followed is 
a scenario where a party, once added to the Consolidated List, could not be 
                                                                                                                           
 168. There is typically little advance consultation with affected Member States (of 
residence or nationality of the listed individual), particularly if they are not 
currently serving on the Security Council. Only those countries that are 
current members of the Security Council automatically receive and are able to 
review statements of case, but not all Member States. This raises questions 
about the transparency of the listing process, with some Member States 
arguing that a version of the statement of case (a redacted version, deleting 
sensitive information) should be made more widely available. 
WATSON INSTITUTE, supra note 20, at 28. 
 169. Jared Genser & Kate Barth, When Due Process Concerns Become Dangerous: The 
Security Council’s 1267 Regime and the Need for Reform, 33 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 
2 (2010) (citing WATSON INSTITUTE TARGETED SANCTIONS PROJECT, STRENGTHENING 
TARGETED SANCTIONS THROUGH FAIR AND CLEAR PROCEDURES 37 (2006), available at 
http://watsoninstitute.org/pub/Strengthening_Targeted_Sanctions.pdf) (“Those targets 
dissatisfied with the freeze on their assets or the restriction of their movement can only hope 
that their state of residence or citizenship will negotiate with whatever country had 
recommended their listing (designating state) to reach a mutual agreement to recommend the 
delisting of the individual. Nevertheless, should any member of the Sanctions Committee 
(consisting of representatives of all countries on the Security Council) choose to block the 
delisting, the target will remain indefinitely listed.”). 
 170. Such ties include allegations of funding and involvement in the bombings of United 
States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
Treasury Department Statement Regarding the Designation of the Global Relief Foundation 
(Oct. 18, 2002), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/po3553.aspx; U.N. Human Rights Comm., Sayadi v. Belgium, Commc’n No. 
1472/2006, ¶¶ 2.3-3.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006 (2008). 
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removed by the state that initially recommended it for listing (Belgium). 
This highlights the potential limits on unilateralism evident in the 
Resolution 1267 Regime. Once a party is listed, delisting becomes 
inherently extralegal, as it is not the product of judicial decision, but rather 
that of international politicking within the United Nations. 
While Belgian courts eventually cleared Sayadi of having Al-Qaeda ties, 
this did not unfreeze his assets, given the procedure for delisting under 
Resolution 1267. Thus, Resolution 1267 rendered Belgium’s domestic legal 
order ineffective to provide a palatable legal remedy to listed individuals. 
This placed Belgium in a position where only convincing 1267 Committee 
members to delist could produce a just outcome. Thus, the delisting of 
Sayadi, while containing a domestic judicial element, ultimately yielded to 
political bargaining and persuasion. 
In practice, domestic review by the very state that advocated for listing 
under Resolution 1267 could not unfreeze Sayadi’s assets. A political 
appeal to the 1267 Committee was the only practical, and eventually 
effective remedy.171 It took over four years from the Belgian ruling, finding 
no justification for listing, until Sayadi and Vinck were removed from the 
Resolution 1267 Consolidated List.172 
Sayadi has further introduced the concept of holding states liable for 
overeager and premature advocacy listing under Resolution 1267. The 
Human Rights Committee (HRC), limited its analysis to violations of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).173 In doing 
so, it ultimately found Belgium liable for the initial listing as a violation of 
Sayadi and Vinck’s rights under the Covenant.174 
                                                                                                                           
 171. UN committee removes 8 from Taliban sanctions list, REUTERS AFRICA (Oct 27, 
2009), available at http://af.reuters.com/article/idAFN2726283620091027 (reporting that the 
“delisted individuals were Patricia Rosa Vinck and Nabil Sayadi, a husband and wife living 
in Belgium . . . ”). 
 172. Id. 
 173. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Sayadi v. Belgium, Commc’n No. 1472/2006, ¶¶ 2.3–
3.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006 (2008) (claiming violations of Articles 2, 4, 12, 14, 
15, 17, 18, 22, 26, and 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). 
 174. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Sayadi v. Belgium, Commc’n No. 1472/2006, ¶ 3.4 
(“Respect for the presumption of innocence, the right to an effective remedy, and the right to 
a procedure with all due structural and functional guarantees have been violated. The 
presumption of innocence had been flouted by the Belgian State’s proposal to place the 
authors’ names on the Sanctions Committee list without “relevant information” in breach of 
article 14, paragraph 2 of the Covenant.”). 
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Even if Resolution 1267 required Belgium to propose suspected 
terrorists for listing, the HRC found Belgium was at fault to the degree that 
suggestion for listing was premature.175 While Belgium, or any other state 
acting unilaterally, lacks the subsequent capability to delist, the state was 
responsible to do what was within its power to achieve delisting, 
compensate the wronged parties, and to “ensure that similar violations do 
not occur in the future.”176 Implicit in this decision is the notion that 
Resolution 1267 operates as an inherent hindrance to unilateral action in 
delisting, and a ceding of sovereignty over a state’s own residents or 
nationals. 
Generally, states that are home to listed parties are unable to offer an 
effective domestic legal remedy, as all delisting decisions rest with the 1267 
Committee. A state unwilling to breach international obligations under 
Resolution 1267 remains solely bound to discretion of the 1267 Committee 
in providing justice to wrongly listed parties. In addition, even if a state is 
willing to breach its obligations under the Resolution 1267 Regime, its 
capabilities to unilaterally unfreeze assets are hindered by the cooperation 
of all other states remaining compliant within the Resolution 1267 Regime. 
In comparison to Belgium’s Sayadi predicament, if a domestic court 
within the United States were to rule the implementation of Resolution 
1267 to be disharmonious with constitutional due process guarantees, the 
claimant would be granted redress under the national constitution, likely in 
conflict with obligations under UNC Article 25. While ruling Executive 
Order 13224 unconstitutional implies a breach of Article 25, overruling 
domestic implementation of Resolution 1267 would not necessarily 
guarantee an effective unfreezing of all relevant assets. The ability of the 
United States, or any other Member Nation, to unfreeze assets targeted by 
the Resolution 1267 Regime would likely require interstate cooperation, 
absent a monopoly of control over all assets relevant to the specific case by 
the acting state. Basically, a state cannot unilaterally unfreeze assets which 
it lacks control over, even if it wants to. 
Even if the United States is poised to potentially overrule Resolution 
1267 implementation in the future, the initial ceding of sovereignty implicit 
in Resolution 1267’s passage would linger beyond any domestic demise of 
                                                                                                                           
 175. U.N. Charter, art. 103 (stating the supremacy of the United Nations Charter to all 
other international obligations.). 
 176. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Sayadi v. Belgium, Commc’n No. 1472/2006, ¶ 10.3, 
12, 13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006 (2008) (“[E]ven though the State party is not 
competent to remove the authors’ names from the United Nations and European lists, it is 
responsible for the presence of the authors’ names on those lists.”).  
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its implementation. Ultimately, the ability of the United States to both 
disregard its UNC Article 25 obligation, and successfully unfreeze assets 
beyond its immediate control, would likely require a triumph of politics 
over law. Specifically, the unfreezing of assets, absent the formal consent of 
the Resolution 1267 Committee, would depend on a successful exercise of 
political influence or perhaps coercion upon relevant states to transgress 
their own obligations under Article 25. 
C. The Politicization of Delisting and Limits of United States 
Unilateralism with regard to Afghan Peace and Reconciliation 
While United States implementation of Resolution 1267 remains dualist, 
this does not afford the luxury of unhindered unilateral action within the 
context of this sanctions regime. Even if unwilling to subordinate its 
domestic constitutional order to binding Security Council Resolutions, the 
United States, in approving the creation of the 1267 Regime, effectively 
ceded sovereignty irrespective of its own discretion over domestic 
implementation. The United States must engage the 1267 Regime in 
pursuing political or military objectives where such goals are intertwined 
with the content of Resolution 1267. Thus, the United States’ courts may be 
postured to violate the United Nations Charter obligation under Article 25, 
but national action is still restricted by the very virtue of the 1267 Regime’s 
existence as it cannot unilaterally unfreeze assets in the pursuit of its self-
interested agenda.177 
These limitations on unilateral action are evident in tensions arising from 
the controversy concerning the delisting of Taliban and those allegedly 
reformed-Taliban. In pursuing military or political objectives stemming 
from its leadership role in NATO operations, the United States may exert 
significant influence within the Security Council, but must still contend 
with the divergent interests of other Security Council members. As the 
United States’ former Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
Richard Holbrooke stated in January 2010: “[L]et me remind you that this 
is not an American decision. It’s a UN Security Council decision, and other 
nations have a vote, and indeed four other nations have a veto on this issue. 
                                                                                                                           
 177. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, London Conference on Afghanistan, Answers questions on U.S. efforts in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan (Jan 28, 2010) available at http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-
english/2010/February/20100204115213xjsnommis0.5005152.html (noting unilateral 
delisting is impossible since France, UK, China, and Russia have a veto on United States 
efforts to remove individuals and entities from the Consolidated List.). 
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So whatever the U.S. did, it would require the consent of other countries 
and I’m virtually certain that wouldn’t be forthcoming anyway.”178 
In June of 2010, The New York Times reported the United Nations was 
accelerating efforts that could lead to the delisting of Taliban leaders from 
the Consolidated List.179 The 1267 Committee sent a delegation to Kabul to 
study the Consolidated List and make recommendations for possible 
changes.180 Delisting of former-Taliban members was previously employed 
as a political tactic to advance peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan. For 
example, in January 2010, five Taliban associated individuals were 
conveniently delisted prior to the London Conference on Afghanistan.181 
In July of 2010, the Washington Post reported Afghan President, Hamid 
Karzai sought removal of up to 50 former Taliban officials from the 
Resolution 1267 Consolidated List.182 In seeking to have former-Taliban 
figures delisted, the Karzai government was influenced by its desire for 
peace, reconciliation, and political settlement within Afghanistan.183 
Afghan outreach to the United Nations was met with calls for more 
evidence to demonstrate the reformed nature of these former-Taliban 
figures.184 Overall, permanent members of the Security Council have taken 
different positions on broad-sweeping requests to delist Taliban associated 
individuals. While the United States has advocated consideration on a case-
by-case basis, Russia and China have frequently objected to such efforts, 
citing their unique security concerns.185 
                                                                                                                           
 178. Id. 
 179. Rod Nordland, United Nations Could Hasten Removal of Taliban Leaders from 
Terror Blacklist, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2010, at A16, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/13/world/asia/13afghan.html. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Colum Lynch & Joshua Partlow, Karzai to Push for Removing Up to 50 ex-Taliban 
Officials from U.N. Blacklist, WASH. POST, July 12, 2010, available at http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/11/AR2010071103505.html. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Rod Nordland, United Nations Could Hasten Removal of Taliban Leaders from 
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Officials within the 1267 Committee have voiced resistance to delisting 
solely as a means of encouraging the peace process.186 The Russian 
Federation, a permanent member of the Security Council and consequently, 
a permanent presence on the 1267 Committee, has frequently resisted 
removal of former-Taliban officials, citing scant evidence, and concern 
over the broader strategic role of the Taliban on Islamist movements 
outside of the region.187 Russia also continues to resist delisting, citing 
concerns regarding Taliban-linked drug trafficking in its own territory.188 
This fixture within the 1267 Committee has also been reluctant to agree to 
removing names, even of deceased Taliban, arguing this could free funds 
for terror related purposes.189 In contrast, the United States continues to 
advocate a policy of case-by-case review, favoring delisting for 
“[i]ndividuals who have cut ties with Al-Qaeda and accepted the Afghan 
constitution and given up the fight.”190 
In October of 2010, Afghanistan’s new Peace Council called for 
removing individuals from the 1267 Sanctions list as a means of aiding 
peace talks.191 Arsala Rahmani,192 claimed that failure to delisting 
approximately 150 individuals under the 1267 Regime would be a 
stumbling block to negotiating Afghan peace.193 In response, the United 
States Department of State cited the broadly cooperative requirements of 
delisting actions and an ongoing evaluation of the Consolidated List 
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underway in collaboration with the United Nations, Member States, and the 
Security Council.194 
Delisting considerations, in the interest of Afghan peace and 
reconciliation, reinforce the extra-legal and overtly political nature of the 
Resolution 1267 Regime. Members, notably the United States, in 
comparison to Russia and China, have taken divergent approaches toward 
broad delisting requests, likely reflecting a tension between security 
concerns and divergent stakes in Afghan security, reconciliation, and the 
success of NATO efforts. 
The United States has an arguably greater interest than other Resolution 
1267 Committee members in delisting as a tool toward securing Afghan 
peace and stability, insofar as the United States participation in NATO 
operations dwarfs that of other states.195 However, as mentioned by former-
Special Representative Holbrooke, the United States remains beholden to 
the overall Resolution 1267 Regime in pursuing delisting efforts tailored to 
serve these interests. Irrespective of its dualist implementation of 
Resolution 1267, the United States, by virtue of advocating for the creation 
of the Resolution 1267 Regime, has ceded sovereignty insofar as it cannot 
unilaterally delist in pursuit of its own military or political objectives. The 
United States may wield significant influence within the Security Council, 
but it remains bound to a necessity for cooperation in effective delisting 
under Resolution 1267. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The domestic implementation of Resolution 1267 by the United States is 
indicative of a national legal order unwilling to fully subordinate itself to 
the edicts of the United Nations Security Council, even if it has encouraged 
and approved of such edicts. The United States has retained autonomous 
discretion over implementation of Resolution 1267 insofar as it has 
reserved the ability to perform administrative and judicial review, 
independent of the Security Council. While this approach superficially 
suggests a threat to Security Council primacy, to some degree it has had the 
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opposite effect, legitimizing asset-freezing mechanisms through enhanced 
process and substantive review, while simultaneously remaining compliant 
with obligations under Article 25 of the United Nations Charter. 
To date, domestic courts within the United States continue to review 
Resolution 1267 implementation, and a successful challenge on 
constitutional due process grounds, does imply a potential violation of UNC 
Article 25. This has not yet occurred. While other legal orders have 
encountered frustrations with due process protection and a lack of available 
substantive evidence to support listing, the United States has avoided either 
dilemma by virtue of the convenience that challenging parties thus far were 
initially recommended for listing by the United States. This has afforded the 
availability of substantive evidence, enabling domestic courts to consider 
the merits for listing. This dynamic has vested domestic implementation 
within the United States with enhanced legitimacy, while further shifting 
the onus for reform of the Resolution 1267 Regime onto legal orders unable 
to reconcile internal due process requirements with the potential 
unavailability of substantive evidence.  
Even if the United States has resisted subjugating its constitutional order 
to the demands of the Security Council, Resolution 1267 still represents a 
distinct ceding of sovereignty by the very virtue of the Regime’s existence. 
In taking a proactive role in establishing the 1267 Regime, the United 
States remains bound to the determinations of the 1267 Committee as this 
body may practically inhibit unilateral action in the context of unfreezing 
assets, consequently frustrating the political or military objectives of the 
United States in its so-called War on Terror. Ultimately, the exercise of 
domestic discretion over Resolution 1267 implementation may place the 
Security Council under the scrutiny of United States courts, but this has 
neither resulted in a violation of UNC Article 25, nor has it amounted to a 
license for unrestricted unilateral action within the subject matter of the 
Security Council’s 1267 Regime. 
 
 
 
 
 
